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ABSTRACT 
The open architecture strategy being utilized within the Department of the Navy (DON) 
has been built on a foundation that Naval Open Architecture (NOA) will provide an 
increase in competition, a decrease in costs and present an opportunity to maximize 
market innovation.  The Small Business Concern (SBC) is often considered the catalyst 
to achieving these benefits.  There have been mixed reviews of NOA and there is 
research to suggest that there are barriers to SBC participation in the DON market.  
Through NOA the DON would like to foster an environment that encourages the SBC to 
participate in the competition for DON contracts thus yielding benefit to the DON.  
However, there remain skeptics that assert that the DON is failing to maximize the 
benefit of SBC participation in DON markets due to barriers.  The result of these real or 
perceived barriers limits SBC participation and as a result, the DON fails to benefit from 
a truly competitive process.   
The purpose of this study is to better to understand the relationship between NOA 
and the role of the SBC in DON contracting.  The goal of this study is to understand and 
provide options to the real or perceived barriers SBCs encounter in NOA.  
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The Open Architecture (OA) strategy being applied within the Department of the 
Navy (DON) has been speculated to yield several benefits to the DON, including 
enhanced competition.  OA has been viewed as one innovative tool for reducing costs 
(through greater efficiencies, enhanced competition, lower life-cycle cost, etc.) while 
creating and maintaining the needed flexibility to quickly respond to the ever-changing 
threat environment (Womble, Schmidt, Arendt, & Fain, 2011, p. 9).  This research 
focuses on the real and perceived barriers that prevent the enhancement of competition by 
way of the small-business concern (SBC) in Naval Open Architecture (NOA) and options 
to facilitate SBC participation.  SBCs, cannot participate in the defense arena due to risk 
suppression mechanisms and the exorbitant costs to enter the market (Cole, Housel, & 
Wolff, 2012, p. 89) .  SBCs cannot afford to follow bureaucratic rules and restrictions 
imposed by the current acquisition process in the DoD (Cole et al., 2012, p. 89).   
This study will substantiate or refute the claim that SBCs encounter barriers to 
enter DON markets through an understanding of DON contract award tendencies on data 
collected from Fiscal Year 2012 (FY12).  Additionally, this research will examine what 
makes a company a recurring DON partner in various NOA and DON markets.  The 
emphases on these points will be used to develop an understanding of the real SBC 
market.  This understanding will be based on profiles of the recurring participants and the 
products or services awarded to various size companies across the entire DON market.  
Awards studied will focus on primary awards to both large and small businesses.  
Research will investigate and develop the options to facilitate SBC participation in the 
DON market through an analysis of existing DON FY12 award data and standing 
regulations.  This research will describe the benefits of an increased association between 
the DON and SBCs to include a discussion of what NOA and DON markets benefit most 
from SBC participation.   
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A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is to better to understand the relationship between DON 
practices, NOA policy and the role SBCs play in the NOA and DON markets.  The goal 
of this study is understand the real or perceived obstacles that the SBC encounters in the 
DON marketplace and to apply lessons learned to NOA and DON markets in an attempt 
to maximize the DON benefits of doing business with the SBC.  Analyzing and 
understanding collected DON spending data will be used to construct options to facilitate 
an increase in SBC participation in the NOA and DON market.  These options are 
necessary to overcome barriers that SBCs encounter upon consideration to enter NOA 
and DON markets.  By understanding spending data, recurring awardee profiles and 
various primary and niche markets; SBCs will be better equipped to utilize options 
designed to facilitate participation and to capitalize on benefits that are offered by the 
SBC to the DON.  In an effort to better understand the real or perceived DON barriers to 
competition and to encourage SBC participation thus maximizing the benefits of a DON 
and SBCs affiliation; a study of primary market data and potential options to facilitate 
SBC participation in the DON market place is required.   
The DON will benefit from this research because the DON will have a better 
understanding of barriers (both real and perceived) the SBC is faced with upon 
participating in NOA and DON markets.  The presentation of market data, along with 
company profiles will assist DON leadership in NOA and DON markets to maximize the 
participation and benefits associated with increased SBC participation.  The analysis of 
data and options provided in this research will encourage the DON to change or stand fast 
on current NOA strategy when considering open competition and the role of the SBC in 
the NOA and DON markets.  
B. BACKGROUND 
One of the principles that NOA is founded upon is that it will increase 
competition when properly executed.  The principle of increased competition is typically 
associated with benefits that allow the DON to capitalize on decreased costs and an 
increased opportunity for innovation.  Many have determined that this opportunity should 
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be derived via the SBC.  The SBC is presently providing the products and solutions 
needed to support Sailors and Marines, and can provide the innovations necessary to help 
solve life cycle sustainment and/or safety of life problems  (Dussault, 2012, p. 13).  This 
sentiment must be assumed to apply across all DON markets to include the NOA market.   
There is currently no research that answers the question of how well NOA 
incorporates the SBC vs. how well the entire DON incorporates the SBC.  To maximize 
the benefit of this study for the DON, research will determine whether the SBC provides 
the DON with an increased level of innovation (captured through intellectual property) 
upon award; as it is claimed by SBC supporters that SBCs make better use of their 
intellectual property.  Perhaps the reason why SBCs are more successful innovators is 
due to its careful use of intellectual property (Cole S. , 2011, p. 20).  These findings on 
intellectual property and innovation will reveal whether or not there is added innovation 
to be gained by the DON through the employment of the SBC vs. a typical large prime 
corporation.  The argument that NOA must include or focus more attention and resources 
on the SBC will be rejected or accepted. 
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
NOA is designed to encourage competition and decrease costs through the 
leverage that DON creates when multiple contract providers are available for selection.  
Additionally, there are laws, instructions and strategic guidance to all federal agencies to 
encourage the participation of SBCs in federal markets (to include NOA and DON 
markets).  As seen in law, it is the declared policy of the Congress that the  
Government should aid, counsel, assist, and protect, insofar as is possible, the 
interests of small-business concerns in order to preserve free competitive enterprise 
(Small Business Act, 2008).  Or witnessed in strategy, a recent change in acquisition 
strategy is to encourage competition and collaboration through the introduction of SBCs 
into the acquisition ecosystem (Cole S. , 2011, p. 13).  The combination of these two 
DON objectives to encourage competition and decrease cost creates the following 
compelling questions that the DON must consider: 
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 Where does the SBC best participate in DON contracting?   
 Does NOA increase SBC participation? 
The primary objective of this research will answer those questions.   
The secondary objective of this thesis is to explore the SBC barriers to entry to 
NOA and DON markets and provide both the DON and SBC options to facilitate SBC 
participation.  It has been documented in previous research that SBCs are underutilized 
and underrepresented in the DON market due to various obstacles.  This research aims to 
determine if the underutilization of the SBC that results in lost competition is due to 
federal barriers of entry to the market place or due to the perception of the SBC that the 
market place is bias and unfair.  Upon learning what the causes of the barriers to entry are 
options to facilitate SBC participation in NOA and DON markets will be offered.   
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 Does NOA increase SBC participation?  
 Where does the SBC best participate in DON contracting? 
 Are the barriers to SBC participation real or perceived? 
 What options are needed to facilitate SBC participation? 
E. RESEARCH METHODS 
The researcher will analyze published reports to determine whether the NOA is 
increasing competition via an encouraged SBC in NOA markets; as an increase in 
competition is a fundamental benefit of NOA.  This approach significantly increases 
opportunities for innovation and competition, enables reuse of components, facilitates 
rapid technology insertion, and reduces maintenance constraints (Naval Open 
Architecture Enterprise Team, 2010, p. 2).  Research and analysis focused on data 
collected from www.defense.gov/contracts and www.usaspending.gov to better 
understand the role of the SBC in DON contracting as the SBC’s role relates to 
competition for prime contracts and ensuing niche market opportunities.  The initial data 
collected from www.defense.gov/contracts required a daily inspection of contracts 
awarded by the DON for the fiscal year 2012 (FY12) from the review of each daily 
public announcement a database was derived that captured the name of the company 
 5
awarded the contract, the amount of the contract, whether the awardee was a large 
business, a group of small businesses or a single small business, as well as the date of the 
award.  A total $66.5B was spent by the DON on the 1,193 prime contracts in excess of 
$6.5M per award were publically announced and awarded by the DON from 1OCT11 to 
30SEP12  (U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
[Public Affairs], 2013).  Each of the 1,193 contracts is in excess of $6.5M and publically 
reported as required by Defense Federal Acquisitions Regulations Supplement (DFARS) 
505.303, public announcement requirement.   
Government policy and regulations were studied in an effort to define the roles 
and responsibilities of the SBC, the acquisition professional, the prime contractor as well 
as the regulating entities within the NOA and DON markets. 
F. SCOPE 
This research addresses gaps in previously conducted NOA studies.  There are a 
number of conflicting arguments that address the range of success NOA has or does not 
have when implementing the SBC as a facilitator to increasing competition in the NOA 
market.  This research includes a literature review used to establish the inconsistencies of 
how NOA and the role of the SBC in the DON market are depicted.  There is a glaring 
omission of real data that exists in previous work concerning NOA and the SBC, past 
work is far more reliant on existing literature.  It is the scope of this work to attempt to 
reconcile any holes that exist in previous work with real data and provide analysis that 
will be used to clarify any misunderstanding that might exist on the role of the SBC in 
NOA and DON markets.  From the analysis provided by this research options to facilitate 
SBC participation in NOA and DON markets will be presented.  Additionally, the 
benefits of DON and SBC association will be discussed and calculated. 
G. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis will be organized to present a sequential and comprehensive flow of 
information, beginning with the introduction of the problem and operational definitions 
of the variables that impact the SBC and the NOA and DON markets.  Following the 
purpose, methodology and definitions of the research the analysis of relationship between 
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NOA and the SBC will be provided leading to the options to facilitate SBC participation 
in the NOA and DON markets.  The chapters are organized in the following manner: In 
Chapter I, the researcher will provide an overview of the thesis problem, purpose and 
methods.  Chapter II will focus on paying particular attention to the operational 
definitions and existing regulations; laws and policy that collectively form the laws, 
instructions and guidance that the DON is encouraged to observe when conducting 
business (in this case the focus will be on the role of the SBC in the NOA and DON 
markets and how NOA influences SBC participation).  Chapter III will offer the analysis 
of data to determine the role of the SBC in NOA and DON markets and conclude if there 
are real or perceived market barriers that prevent SBC participation and as a result limit 
DON benefits of an association with SBCs.  Chapter IV will focus on findings and 
options to facilitate SBC participation in NOA and DON markets in an effort to 
encourage DON cost savings and to increase benefits through an increase in competition 
for prime contracts.  Chapter V will summarize the research and present the conclusion 
and limitations of the study that should be further explored.   
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. NAVY OPEN ARCHITECTURE BACKGROUND  
In reaction to the rapidly evolving information technology (IT) environment as 
well sensitivity to growing IT costs, the Department of the Navy (DON) has developed 
and implemented a strategy of open architecture (OA) models.  The Navy and Marine 
Corporations have adopted OA as a way to reduce the rising cost of Naval warfare 
systems and platforms while continuing to increase capability delivery on shortened 
demand timelines (Naval Open Architecture Enterprise Team, 2010, p. 2).  On August 5, 
2004, the DON released the initial delineation of this strategy in a memorandum titled 
Naval Open Architecture Scope and Responsibilities.  The first version of the Naval 
Open Architecture (NOA) Handbook was derived from this policy and subsequent 
versions of the handbook defined the DON’s application of OA, as well as outlined the 
roles and responsibilities of the contractor as well as the program manager (PM).  The 
NOA Handbook also described the associated benefits NOA provided to the organization 
as well as would be contractors.  
Naval Open Architecture (NOA) is the confluence of business and 
technical practices yielding modular, interoperable systems that adhere to 
open standards with published interfaces.  This approach significantly 
increases opportunities for innovation and competition, enables reuse of 
components, facilitates rapid technology insertion, and reduces 
maintenance constraints.  (Naval Open Architecture Enterprise Team, 
2010, p. 2) 
1. Principles 
NOA is built upon five principles that are used to ensure each contract awarded 
by the DON meets standards of modularity and design disclosure, reusability, 
interoperability, affordability and competition and collaboration.  Table 1 lists the five 
principles of NOA.  
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Table 1.   Five Principles of Naval Open Architecture 
(From Naval Open Architecture Enterprise Team, 2010, pp. 65–67) 
These standards are intended to be a quick check on a system’s disposition that, 
when properly applied, will yield the benefits of an open system (Naval Open 
Architecture Enterprise Team, 2010, p. 65).  
a. Modularity and Design Disclosure 
Modularity is based on the idea that software, middleware and hardware 
can separated into singular components to allow for rapid system changes as the 
environment demands.  An anticipated advantage presented by modularity is that there 
will be increased opportunity for innovative participation in NOA and DON markets.  
Design disclosure encourages competition via readily obtainable design 
specifications; this disclosure is used by the DON to eliminate single source vending 
practices.  Design disclosure permits evolutionary design, technology insertion, 
competitive innovation, and alternative competitive approaches from multiple qualified 
sources (Cole S. , 2011, p. 11). 
b. Reusability 
Reusability is a principle that ensures the maximization of existing 
technologies and in various systems.  Has the program investigated potential reuse 
components from other programs?  (Naval Open Architecture Enterprise Team, 2010, p. 
65).  This principle is used to drive down delivery time and costs of new projects.  
Reusability encourages the minimal employment of research and development (R&D) 
expenditures and as a result is in conflict with the NOA benefit of increased competition.  
Reusability, when enthusiastically employed decreases contract opportunities. 
 9
c. Interoperability 
Interoperability provides the DON with an opportunity to explore the 
question of whether or not the proposed technology will work in a joint environment with 
other Federal Agencies (including other military branches).  Interoperability asks whether 
the functions of the technology been well defined to facilitate commonality with other 
service programs (Naval Open Architecture Enterprise Team, 2010, p. 66). 
d. Affordability 
Affordability is a series of questions that are used to determine whether 
the project, while meeting requirements, is completed as cost efficiently as possible.  This 
principle considers the system utilization of commercial off the shelf (COTS) material as 
an option to designing entirely new systems.  Has the program made use of commodity 
COTS computing and networking hardware to reduce procurement and maintenance 
cost?  (Naval Open Architecture Enterprise Team, 2010, p. 66).  Affordability as a 
principle does not directly encourage small business concern (SBC) utilization or 
innovation maximization by the DON.  
e. Competition and Collaboration 
Competition and collaboration is perhaps the most critical principle used 
to ensure that the SBC is represented in NOA.  This principle ensures that the DON 
maximizes the use of the SBC in NOA in attempt to increase the benefits of SBC 
participation in NOA markets.  Is there a Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) and 
technology transition plan in place to encourage participation by qualified small 
businesses?  (Naval Open Architecture Enterprise Team, 2010, p. 67).  This is the only 
direct reference to the participation of the SBC in the entire document, however, this 
question only ensures SBC participation in SBIR, which implies the SBC is only a 
participant in NOA as a R&D provider.  The SBC is not implicated in NOA Handbook as 
a provider of the modular, affordable and interoperable components of systems. 
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2. NOA Competition and Innovation 
Previous NOA research suggests that there will be a significant increase in 
opportunities for innovation and competition due to these open standards.   
OA naturally encourages competition and collaboration.  Unlike systems 
that are acquired sole-source and restrict the full and open competition of 
resources, OA promotes competition among industries, leading to better 
products at a reduced price.  In addition, since open standards are used, 
competition in industry can be leveraged when completing system 
upgrades or when fielding an entirely new, but interoperable system.  
(Wolff, 2011, p. 11) 
It is often implied by a contingent of NOA supporters that an increase in 
competition will come in part by way of the qualified small business.  This belief is 
derived from the combination of opinions, the first, being that the component level 
modularity that NOA is built upon will generate numerous contract opportunities; the 
second, is that the SBC is a great source of innovation.  The NOA emphasis on system 
reviews is on enterprise architectures, strategic reuse, and the potential for small business 
participation throughout the program lifecycle (Naval Open Architecture Enterprise 
Team, 2010, p. 18).  A specific focus will be to evaluate whether the system functional 
definition follows modular design tenets and well-defined interfaces to effectively 
manage risks of obsolescence and dependence upon a sole source of supply thus 
increasing competition and the participation of the SBC (Naval Open Architecture 
Enterprise Team, 2010, p. 18). 
There is a developing opinion in the current federal administration that the SBC 
leads the nation in innovation.  SBCs have repeatedly demonstrated a contribution to 
leading the nation in innovation and driving the economy, as expressed in the example of 
hiring more than sixty five percent of all new jobs and holding more patents than all the 
nation’s universities and large Corporations combined (USD [AT &L], 2010, p. 10).  The 
federal belief in the SBC and the SBC’s ability to innovate places onus squarely on the 
DON to maximize the participation of the SBC in all phases of acquisition. 
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3. Competition Guidance  
Despite the mounting value placed on the SBC by the Federal Government (FED) 
there is minimal guidance to PMs to ensure SBC participation in the NOA Handbook.  
The most direct mention of the SBC is from appendix 3 of the NOA Checklist, asks the 
question, and is there a SBIR and technology transition plan in place to encourage 
participation by qualified small businesses?  (Naval Open Architecture Enterprise Team, 
2010, p. 67).  This question, however, is limited only to SBIR, which indicates SBC 
participation in NOA strictly as an element of R&D.  What is not mentioned in the NOA 
Handbook is that participation in the SBIR program does not guarantee that the SBC will 
ever realize a contract in the NOA market.  Contractors have reported difficulties in 
retaining their data rights in Phase III of the SBIR program, which involves 
commercialization of the project (House Committee on Armed Services, 2012, p. 66).  
SBC’s participating in SBIR despite having its R&D on a particular project funded by the 
DON, hopeful of a lucrative award, may not realize an award on an NOA contract 
because that funding is not provided by SBIR rules.  During phase III, firms are expected 
to obtain private funding, or other non-SBIR federal funding, to further develop and 
commercialize their SBIR technology into the commercial marketplace or transition their 
SBIR technology into DoD programs (Ryburn, 2012, p. 17).  The insinuation that SBCs 
are to only participate in NOA as providers of R&D, begs the question of where does the 
increase in competition come from via NOA, and how are the advocated benefits of this 
increase in competition realized?  
The NOA handbook in concert with NOA policy does not adequately encourage 
SBC participation in NOA markets.  NOA policy and guidance does not describe how an 
increase in competition will be accomplished by the DON or how the benefits of 
increased competition will be realized.  Without this guidance, an increase in competition 
via NOA cannot be accounted for by the DON.  This information is necessary to discern 
whether or not NOA does in fact increase competition.    
Throughout the NOA Handbook there is no direct association made to the SBC 
and an attempt to increase competition, despite growing emphasis placed on the use of 
the SBC throughout all federal agencies to maximize competition.  It is well documented 
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throughout the Federal Government Agencies that including the SBC to the maximum 
practical extent possible is a priority.  As a consequence of federal priorities, it should be 
anticipated in all DON markets (to include NOA markets) that an increasing value will be 
placed on the participation of the SBC.  In May of 2012, the National Economic Council 
(NEC) demonstrated the SBC emphasis in federal markets by stating that the current 
administration is ensuring that every small business can compete for and win federal 
contracts by awarding nearly $300 billion in federal prime contacts to small businesses 
(GAO, 2012, p. ii).  It is because of the federal administration’s emphasis on the 
participation of the SBC that there is the expectation that all federal entities, including the 
DON, will ensure competitive opportunities for SBC to gain access to prime contract 
awards.   
The NOA Handbook is generalized and does not clearly specify what size 
enterprise will provide the espoused increase in competition.  Increased competition in 
the form of more large enterprises competing for prime contracts does little to capitalize 
on the intended NOA benefits of innovation, competition and flexibly.  The goal of 
maximizing program flexibility to enable competition and programmatic course changes 
must be balanced against providing the contractor enough incentive to agree to the 
contract (Naval Open Architecture Enterprise Team, 2010, p. 4).  There is a clear 
message in the NOA strategy that NOA has set goals to maximize innovation, 
competition and flexibility, however, the strategy fails to identify how or better yet what 
type of company will propel the DON to attain these goals.  Logically, it would seem that 
the more enterprises that are introduced to the market, the obvious benefits gained by the 
DON would be decreased costs and an increased talent pool from which to develop ideas.  
However, there is little evidence to suggest that NOA has increased competition thus 
decreasing costs and increasing innovation.   
The NOA model is commonly used to establish the argument that the DON 
believes as a byproduct in the application of NOA there should be an increase in the 
opportunities for competition.  Throughout the NOA Handbook several references are 
made to competition; facilitate competition, true competition, increase competition, 
enable competition, enhance competition, effective competition, frequent competition, 
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continuous competition and encouraging competition (Naval Open Architecture 
Enterprise Team, 2010).  Despite the efforts to focus on the concept of the benefits of 
competition the NOA Handbook fails to clearly and succinctly address the catalyst for the 
concept of competition.  Not only is the catalyst for competition omitted from the NOA 
Handbook, there also is no clear understanding of the role of the SBC in NOA.  Is 
increased competition accomplished by way of the SBC as a prime contractor?  Or is an 
increase in competition as it applies to the SBC only intended to apply to limited 
subcontracts that offer little promise of sustained participation in NOA markets?  Or even 
worse, is an increase in competition by way of the SBC reserved solely for R&D through 
the SBIR program? 
B. THE INTENDED ROLE OF THE SMALL BUSINESS CONCERN 
There is research that suggests that SBCs are underutilized and reluctant to 
participate in the NOA and DON market for a variety of reasons.  These reasons range 
from DON bias to large corporations, to multiple barriers of SBC entry to NOA and DON 
market that are attributed to fees, bureaucracy and perceptions (Cole et al., 2012, p. 89).  
Startups and other small businesses are often told that government contracting is a great 
option for business growth, but the process of competing for government contracts seems 
complicated and challenging (Mills, 2011, p. 11).   
The SBC is often regarded as a facilitator to increase competition in technological 
markets, defined for the purposes of this research as Advanced Data Processing (ADP), 
Information Technology (IT) and Telecommunications (TELECOM) due the modularity 
of systems and a preponderance of software, middleware and hardware in these Product 
Services Codes (PSCs) will be referred to as the NOA market.  However, there is little 
evidence to suggest that the NOA has fully capitalized on the employment of the SBC or 
that the SBC is a priority for DON market professionals, where the DON market is 
defined as all PSCs (both technical and non-technical) combined.   
The language used in the guidance to PMs by the DON to incorporate SBCs in 
NOA and DON markets is suggestive; and the governance of programs designed to 
protect the SBC are questionable.  Due to a lack of governance, large firms have shown a 
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repeated pattern of cutting small businesses out of the marketplace (Womble et al., 2011, 
p. 30).  When this lack of governance occurs, the government loses a competent 
innovator and price competitor—increasing the potential for mediocre performance, cost 
overruns, and schedule delays (Womble et al., 2011, p. 30). 
There is no specific guidance offered via NOA Handbook to DON PMs to 
leverage the SBC to increase competition via NOA.  However, it has been stated by 
numerous NOA supporters that an increase in competition must come via the SBC in 
order to capitalize on the propensity to innovate that is often attributed to the SBC.  It was 
anticipated that OA principles would enable small, innovative businesses to enter the 
defense market (Cole et al., 2012, p. 89). 
NOA is built on a foundation that as a result of thorough NOA procedures that, 
when properly executed, will result in an increase in competition in the NOA market.  As 
a byproduct of increased competition; lower costs and improved product development 
times are anticipated benefits when executing NOA.  Lowered costs by way of an 
increase in competition across all phases of NOA markets would seemingly be the goal of 
NOA; however, there is evidence to suggest that the SBC is not being utilized to the 
fullest extent possible as a result; the DON is missing competition and innovation 
opportunities.  Data suggest that regardless of the product or service certain companies 
have been and will continue to be awarded to large contracts despite the application of 
open architecture models in NOA and DON markets (United States Government, 2013).  
The recurrence of the same prime contractors being awarded contracts is contrary to the 
advocated value of the SBC conveyed by the current administration. 
From Main Street shops to high-tech startups, America’s small businesses and 
entrepreneurs are the engine of our economy and one of our country’s greatest assets 
(White House, 2012, p. i).  Large corporation biases seemingly eliminates the SBC from 
participating in the NOA and DON primary markets and the recurrence of the same SBCs 
being awarded contracts, limits most established or start up SBCs to the secondary niche 
markets in the form of a subcontractor or R&D provider.  While sub-contracting can be 
of benefit to the SBC, it is important to point out the sub-contractors relinquish some 
control over the project and become beholden to the demands of what evidence suggests 
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is very limited number of prime contractors that the NOA and DON markets use time and 
time again.  There is a troubling recurrence of the same top contractors awarded prime 
awards for FY12 and this is disconcerting considering the $94.5B in contracts awarded 
by the DON in FY12  (United States Government, 2013), and the relevance of the SBC’s 
role in the United States’ Economy.  Over the last two decades, small and new businesses 
have been responsible for creating 2 out of every 3 net new jobs, and today the country’s 
28 million small firms employ 60 million Americans, half of the private sector workforce 
(White House, 2012, p. i). 
C. WEAKNESS IN LITERATURE 
A recurring weakness in NOA literature is that there is a lack of quantitative 
evidence to support claims made that NOA is increasing or decreasing competition or 
capitalizing on the innovative nature of SBCs.  The SBC is presently providing 
 the products, solutions needed to support Sailors and Marines, and can provide 
 the innovations necessary to help solve life cycle sustainment problems (Dussault, 2012, 
p. 13).  Due to NOA competition and innovation claims, unsupported by data, there is a 
necessity for contract award data to be collected and analyzed to demonstrate NOA 
success or failure.  As the cumulative effect of the guiding principles of NOA suggest, 
NOA should decrease DoD cost through an increase in competition that can be leveraged 
when negotiating contract costs.  It is significant for the DON to understand through data 
if there has been an increase in the involvement of SBCs in NOA markets due to NOA 
guidance as predicted.   
D. BARRIERS TO SBC PARTICIPATION 
The SBC is typically portrayed as an underdog that is deterred from participating 
in the DON market due to a number of barriers to entry (Cole et al., 2012, p. 89).  Large 
defense companies have complied with the DON’s risk mitigation requirements primarily 
due to large monetary resources (Cole S. , 2011, p. 20).  However, these same 
requirements eliminate much of the potential competition and innovation available by 
way of the SBC (Cole S. , 2011, p. 20).  It is not clearly understood, through available 
research, whether these barriers are real (created by the DON) or perceived 
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(misunderstood by the SBC) or a combination of both.  As recently as March 19, 2012, 
the House Committee on Armed Services conducted a panel on the Challenges to Doing 
Business with the Defense Department this panel explored opportunities to reduce 
Defense Industry barriers to entry.  A portion of this panel focused on the role of the SBC 
and barriers that applied specifically to SBCs in participation in the Defense Industry (to 
include DON).  There is a preponderance of literature that suggests there are SBC 
barriers to participation.  It has been reported that FY12 competition figures reflect 
significant barriers to competition due to reliance on non-competitive follow-on 
procurements for mature weapon systems, directed source (foreign military sales) buys, 
and limited new starts of major weapon programs in the current budget environment, said 
Pentagon spokeswoman Lt. Col. Melinda Morgan (Castelli, 2013, p. 1).   
However, real contracting data has not been collected and applied to these 
reported barriers to determine whether these barriers are real or perceived by various 
NOA and DON market participants.  The following section focuses on some of the 
barriers that are most likely to influence SBC participation in NOA and DON markets. 
1. Design Disclosure 
Design disclosure is defined as within the constraints of contractual data rights, a 
detailed description of the contractor’s approach to facilitate the sharing of system or 
component (e.g., software, hardware, middleware) design information (Naval Open 
Architecture Enterprise Team, 2010, p. 20).  Design disclosure is a potential barrier to 
SBC participation due to the SBCs amplified reliance on its limited innovation and 
creative ideas.  Innovation and creative ideas are the intangible assets of companies that 
increase the value producing momentum and provide new opportunities for competitive 
positioning (Bounfour & Housel, 2011, p. 1).  Due to design disclosure requirements, a 
SBC could potentially eliminate itself from NOA and DON markets initiated by the 
perception of a threat from competitors that have access to intellectual property due 
disclosure requirements.  In a 2012 report by the House Committee on Armed Service, a 
defense representative noted that the pace of business is picking up but DoD contracting 
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is not responding due to increased oversight and mandated disclosures of proprietary 
information (House Committee on Armed Services, 2012, p. 85). 
The SBC’s primary dilemma when participating with the DON is that the SBC is 
outwardly more reliant upon its limited intellectual property.  When intellectual property 
is used as the catalyst to provide innovative ideas that yield organization survivability the 
large corporation (when compared to the SBC) has more intellectual property to disclose.  
For instance, over the course of the past 24 months BAE Systems INC., a top DON 
contract awardee, submitted 156 patents in the U.S. compared to the one patent submitted 
in the U.S. by the top DON ADP Software provider, Blue Tech INC. (LexisNexis, 2013).  
Unlike larger firms, if small firms succeed, they must stay on the leading edge of 
technology and innovation; they do not have the luxury of a foundation of long-term 
government contracts to sustain them if they fail to perform (Garrett, 2007, p. 12).  The 
SBC must judiciously consider the profound impact on its organization when disclosing 
what appears to be a disproportionate amount of limited intellectual property in order to 
do business with the DON.  The repercussions of BAE disclosing one of its 156 patents, 
in this example six-tenths of a percent of its intellectual property to the DON is less likely 
to impact the survivability of BAE Systems INC.  Conversely, it would appear that Blue 
Tech INC. can ill afford to disclose one hundred percent (one of one) its intellectual 
property in order to participate in the NOA or DON market.   
One of the most pressing concerns the SBC faces in being a primary contractor or 
subcontracting for a large corporation in NOA and DON markets, is that once the initial 
contract is complete and its intellectual property is relinquished to the DON, what then 
does the SBC retain as leverage for future opportunities?  The Offeror shall describe its 
plan for making design and interface information available as soon as possible after it is 
defined or established (Naval Open Architecture Enterprise Team, 2010, p. 37).  The 
SBC once participating in the NOA or DON market has the obligation to submit design 
information as soon as possible.  This type of expedient disclosure provides the DON or 
prime contractor with a significant amount of time to review designs and solicit follow on 
competition.  The primary contractor no longer has an obligation or a reliance on unique 
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intellectual property specific to the originally contracted SBC (because NOA requires 
design disclosure) for competitive alternatives.  
Design Disclosure means making data related to the design of a 
component, subsystem or system available to qualified recipients, with a 
goal of establishing and maintaining a process that will provide “early and 
often” design disclosure directly to the Government or to third-party 
contractors via Government-established access.  This data is sufficient to 
allow the third party to develop and produce a competitive alternative.  
(Naval Open Architecture Enterprise Team, 2010, p. 79) 
It appears that through long standing relationships with the DON that top large 
Corporations hold considerable strategic advantages when participating in the DON 
market.  As seen by the fifty-one percent of FY12 DON prime contracts in excess of 
$6.5M awarded to just ten companies (U.S. Department of Defense Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense [Public Affairs], 2013).  With intellectual property 
divulged the large corporation in collaboration with the DON can seek alternative 
subcontracting opportunities through different SBCs.  Once intellectual property has been 
disclosed, and the initial contract obligations have been met, the prime contractor along 
with the DON has an opportunity to consider an SBC that has a recurring relationship 
with a specific prime contractor similar to the preference displayed by the DON when 
awarding recurring prime contracts to familiar companies.    
When participating in NOA and DON markets the SBC, as a primary or 
subcontractor, is gambling that their organization will retain project opportunities for 
future phases, version updates or system upgrades by virtue of being the originator of the 
technology.  This type of guarantee is difficult to come by in what is supposed to be and 
touted as a competitive process by the Department of Defense (DoD) and DON.  When 
multiple contractors are involved the DON is generally required to provide all contractors 
a fair opportunity to be considered (GAO, 2012, p. 1).  Through NOA the DON would 
like to stimulate an environment that encourages the SBC to participate in technology 
markets.  SBC participation not only accounts for increased competition and the benefits 
associated with maximizing competition but it is also important to mention the 
significance of the public appearance that the DON is an entity that is stimulating the 
economy through the healthy employment of the SBC  
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2. Prime Practices 
Prime contractors in our review told US they structure their subcontracts 
to provide the required items, while reducing their risk exposure and 
maximizing their profit potential.  For example, prime contractors 
generally attempted to shift cost risk onto their subcontractors through the 
Use of fixed-price subcontracts even when their own contract with the 
government was cost-reimbursement.  (GAO, 2010, p. 4) 
A recent report by the House Committee on Armed Services describes a process 
in which federal prime contractors are utilizing subcontractors at an increased rate.  At 
first glance this seemed to be a positive result of regulations aimed at incorporating more 
business into the federal market place; namely an opportunity for SBCs to find additional 
entry to the DoD acquisition process.  However prime contractor practices as they apply 
to sub-contractors (namely SBCs) have come under increased scrutiny from some in the 
Defense Industry.  A Defense Industry Representative stated that DoD contracting 
officers have no visibility into discussions between prime contractors and subcontractor 
and that once a small business was rolled up into a large contract, contracting officers 
have no visibility on the fact that large primes pressure subcontractors to cut prices, only 
to increase profit for the prime (House Committee on Armed Services, 2012, p. 89).   
Companies that are awarded prime contracts are expected to give full and fair 
consideration to qualified sources other than the prime contractor for the development or 
construction of major subsystems and components of major weapon systems (GAO, 2010, 
p. 2).  A representative from the Defense Industry pointed out that a typical practice is 
that large prime contractors decide on their sub-contractors with little to no government 
oversight and that prime contractors consistently use the same small set of sub-
contractors (House Committee on Armed Services, 2012, p. 82).  As a result an 
opportunity for SBC participation is foregone by the DON and left to the prime 
contractor to decide on SBC market participation.  Again, this points to a potential barrier 
for SBC entry to NOA and DON markets and suggests that the sub-contracting process is 
not always competitive.   
Despite regulations that allow the government to intervene, the prime contractor 
remains largely unregulated by the DON in its subcontracting effort.  However, program 
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officials seemed reluctant to use available acquisition regulations that enable the 
government to gain visibility into the prime contractor’s subcontracting effort, largely 
because of fears regarding government liability (GAO, 2010, p. 7).  Utilizing rightful 
authority and implementing the use of all government regulations is an opportunity to 
facilitate SBC participation in the federal market place. 
Some participants indicated that big business was predisposed to an 
engineering solution and a small set of subcontractors that they 
consistently use.  It was stated that it was very difficult to get the primes to 
listen to small business ideas and that “big business is in control.”  It was 
suggested that small businesses need direct access to the DoD decision-
makers/acquisition officials because big business did not want direct 
competition from small business.  One participant specifically stated that 
he felt that the end-user, not the prime contractor, should make the 
decision to go with a specific sub-contractor/small business to buy a 
component/end-item.  (House Committee on Armed Services, 2012, p. 82) 
SBC advocates often cite barriers that prevent the DON from maximizing the use 
of the SBC as a method to leverage competition and capitalize on SBC innovation.  The 
perceived failure of the DON to include SBCs in the defense area is a failure that is 
diluted by the claim that SBCs contribute at a much more prevalent rate as 
subcontractors.  Based on some estimates, 60 to 70 percent of work on defense contracts 
is now done by subcontractors, with certain industries aiming to outsource up to 80 
percent of the work (GAO, 2010, p. 1).  However, participation as a subcontractor leaves 
the SBC bound to a prime contractor that may use its leverage to exploit the SBC’s 
willingness to participate in NOA and DON markets or worse yet use the SBCs own 
intellectual property (because of design disclosure) to its advantage for SBC elimination 
on follow-on contracts.  Questionable large prime contractor practices as they apply to 
sub-contract awards to SBCs have been observed including a failure of the government to 
influence sub-contract decisions.  In a 2010 briefing to Congress, the GAO described 
practices between prime and sub-contractors as biased stating that prime contractors rely 
heavily on affiliates from within their own companies to perform sub-contracted work 
(GAO, 2010, p. 37).  The report went on to state further evidence of biased prime 
contractor practices to sub-contractor selection stating that some prime contractors select 
and manage affiliates that may work on their programs using some of the same methods 
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as with external sub-contractors (GAO, 2010, p. 37).  It is clear to understand based on 
these statements why a SBC would be hesitant to participate in NOA or DON markets.  
Typical prime contracting practices are not influenced by the DON and as a result leave 
the SBC at the mercy of the prime contractor.  Contracting officials stated that the 
government wants to avoid influencing major decisions such as sub-contract competition 
to prevent government assumption of the prime’s responsibilities (GAO, 2010, p. 35). 
The barrier presented by the lack of oversight and questionable prime practices is 
an ongoing concern of the SBC.  Multiple reports have been generated that support the 
claim that there is a fundamental lack of government protection for the SBC rights as 
well as SBC intellectual property.  Two years after the aforementioned GAO report, the 
House Committee on Armed Services stated in a 2012 report that DoD contracting 
officers have no oversight on the discussions that take place between prime and sub-
contracts and went on to state that prime contractors pressure sub-contractors to cut 
prices only to increase profit for the prime contractor.  (House Committee on Armed 
Services, 2012, p. 89).  The argument that predatory prime practices prevent the SBC 
from participating in NOA and DON markets seems plausible given that both prime 
contractors and government officials agree that sub-contract awards are not determined 
by an unbiased entity.  Prime contractors and government officials stated that the 
government does not play a role in determining whether to award subcontracts 
competitively or sole source (GAO, 2010, p. 35). 
3. Risk 
SBCs, cannot participate in the DON due to risk suppression mechanisms and the 
exorbitant costs to enter the market (Cole et al., 2012, p. 89).  SBCs cannot afford to 
follow bureaucratic rules and restrictions imposed by the current process in the DON 
(Cole et al., 2012, p. 89). 
According to the authors, SBCs incur obstacles; namely the risk adverse culture, 
exorbitant entry costs and bureaucracy and as a result cannot participate in the federal 
market place.  The volumes of regulations specific to government and defense 
contracting dissuades many companies from participating in and competing for 
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government contracts (House Committee on Armed Services, 2012, p. 73).  Given the 
DON’s principle that NOA increases competition and this claim made by Cole et al. and 
the House Committee on Armed Services, it is reasonable to assert that NOA must only 
increase competition for a limited number of prime contract providers.  Increasing 
competition for the same prime contractors time and time again would be a failure to 
capitalize on the innovative nature of the SBC.  Not only would the DON miss an 
opportunity to increase innovation the DON could not experience decreased cost due to 
the leverage created by increased competition.  While multiple resources identify that 
SBCs are deterred from participating for DoD contracts for a variety of reasons, such as 
the DoD’s aversion to risk, SBC cost to enter the market and rules and restrictions  the 
research falls short in an attempt to explore the reasons for the sentiment.  Many 
described the defense acquisition workforce as part of a “risk-averse” culture where 
program managers, in particular, have difficulty in balancing risks in managing cost, 
schedule and performance of acquisition programs (House Committee on Armed 
Services, 2012, p. vi).   
Understanding if the barriers to SBC participation are real or perceived or a 
combination of both will allow for an increased understanding of obstacles that SBCs 
encounter when participating in NOA and DON markets.  From analysis of these 
obstacles options to facilitate SBC participation in NOA and DON markets can be 
derived.  
Large prime contractors have complied with the DoD’s low-risk requirements 
primarily due to large monetary resources (Cole S. , 2011, p. 20).  However, these same 
requirements eliminate much of the potential competition and innovation available in 
SBCs (Cole S. , 2011, p. 20). 
A claim is made that SBC competition is eliminated by DoD requirements, in this 
case as cited by Cole due to large monetary resources used to suppress DoD (in this case 
DON) risk (Cole S. , 2011, p. 20).  Cole (2011) offers that there is a problem in which 
SBCs remove themselves from the competitive process because of upfront fees and costs 
designed by the DoD to minimize potential risk.  The idea that there is a pay to play 
obstacle that prevents potential benefits to competition is introduced as a barrier to SBC 
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entry to the NOA and DON markets.  This barrier encourages the superiority of the large 
prime contractor resulting in the elimination of the SBC as a catalyst to increase 
competition through NOA.  The SBC must weigh the entry costs as they decide to enter 
the DON market vs. the actual resources available to attempt to do business with the 
DON.  SBCs which often do not have the resources to hire counsel or experts in 
government contracting, may find government contracting too difficult to navigate 
(House Committee on Armed Services, 2012, p. 59).  Unfortunately, there is no 
quantifiable data to support the claim that the SBC is eliminated by the DON because of 
risk suppression mechanisms or through a process of self-elimination due to entry costs 
that cause a failure of the SBC to participate in NOA and DON markets.   
E. SBC PROTECTION 
The DoD and by extension the DON is cited in recent research as not providing 
adequate oversight to SBC participation in NOA and DON markets.  The panel found 
that DoD lacks the ability to track small business participation at the lower subcontract 
tiers.  (House Committee on Armed Services, 2012, p. vi).  The lack oversight was not 
the only mentioned failing of the DoD as it applies to the SBC, the report went on to state 
that the DoD lacks a culture that encourages SBC participation where appropriate.  
(House Committee on Armed Services, 2012, p. vi).  Despite the findings in the House 
Committee on Armed Services 2012 report it must be pointed out that the DON along 
with the FED has taken measures to ensure that the SBC is properly represented and 
protected in NOA and DON markets.  Federal Acquisitions Regulations (FAR), Small 
Business Innovative Research (SBIR) Program in conjuction with the Small Business Act 
(SBA) collectively form the protection policy of the SBC in NOA markets.  It is in the 
best interst of the DON to encourage SBC participation and through these restrictions the 
DON provides the SBC with what is thought to be a fair and level playing field that 
allows for open competiton for DON contracts.  When the government restricts 
competition to small businesses, it has vested interest in seeing that a substantial portion 
of the work is actually performed by small businesses (House Committee on Armed 
Services, 2012, p. 24).   
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Unfortunately, the rules governing the control on sub-contracting are written in 
such a way that businesses attempting to comply are confused, and contracting personnel 
are hard pressed to determine if the rules are being followed (House Committee on 
Armed Services, 2012, p. 25).  While the essence of regulations is to protect the SBC, the 
regualtions are only as good as they are enforced and understood.  The following three 
SBC protection mechanisms, FAR, SBIR and SBA collectively form the protection 
policy as it applies to the SBC via the NOA Handbook. 
1. Federal Acquisitions Regulations 
Part 19 of the FAR defines what federal definition of a “small business” is as well 
as thoroughly describes the roles and responsibilities of all acquisition participants and 
organizations; as it applies to federal acquisition practices.  The FAR also recommends 
strategies for contracting officers to use when considering the inclusion of small 
businesses when determining contract awards.  The FAR is used to gain a better 
understanding of the definitions, regulations and policies that contracting officers must 
adhere to when considering a small business as well as to gain an understanding of what 
obstacles a small business may encounter when attempting to submit a competitive bid on 
a prime contract.   
This resource provides in great detail the legal aspects of what constitutes a small 
business from a federal perspective.  However, and rather surprisingly, the FAR fails to 
state specific target metrics when awarding prime contracts to small businesses.  There is 
an abundance of suggestions on how to encourage small business participation and 
solicitation but it is obvious that the document merely suggests certain contracting 
behaviors.  The contracting officer is only obligated to consider a small business as a 
viable option rather than award a small business a prime contract.   
As a result of the suggested behavior rather than directed behavior there appears 
to be an opportunity for contracting officers, if so inclined, to consistently award 
contracts to large prime contractors and  further perpetuate the tendency to choose a 
known commodity.  The FAR is equally as suggestive to the prime contractor and 
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appeals to the prime contractor to provide SBCs the maximum opportunity to participate 
in NOA and DON markets.   
Any contractor receiving a contract for more than the simplified 
acquisition threshold must agree in the contract that small business, 
veteran-owned small business, service-disabled veteran-owned small 
business, HUBZone small business, small disadvantaged business, and 
women-owned small business concerns will have the maximum 
practicable opportunity to participate in contract performance consistent 
with its efficient performance.  (Department of Defense, 1998, p. 19) 
Given the suggestive nature of the guidance to agencies as well as prime 
contractors it is not very difficult to understand the SBCs hesitation to enter NOA and 
DON markets.  
2. NOA Handbook (SBIR) 
There is a predisposition for large prime contractors to dominate the NOA and 
DON markets.  As a consequence of the DON’s reliance on large prime contractors, the 
SBIR Program was developed in an attempt to provide the SBC with the opportunity to 
participation in NOA and DON markets.  SBIR contracts are used by small businesses to 
cleave a foothold into the defense marketplace (Womble, et al., 2011, p. 30).  The SBIR 
program is designed to give the SBC a prospect at gaining entry into NOA and 
 DON markets and has been met with mixed reviews.  Without governance, large primes 
have shown a recurring pattern of cutting SBCs out of NOA markets (Womble et al., 
2011, p. 30).  Just as other regulations put in place to protect the interest of the SBC the 
oversight of SBIR has faced negative scrutiny.  Without the proper control and oversight 
the SBC is lost as are the benefits of SBC participation in the NOA market.  When the 
loss of oversight occurs the government loses a competent innovator and price competitor 
(Womble, et al., 2011, p. 30). 
The prevailing thought on the complexity on the guidance for the SBIR program 
is not unlike most federal acquisition programs.  The perception among SBIR critics is 
that while the program is well intended the program is difficult to participate in and 
presents the SBC obstacles through complexity that curtail SBC participation.  There was 
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strong concurrence from the panel that the SBIR program is very difficult to use and 
needs to be simplified.  (House Committee on Armed Services, 2012, p. 82).   
As the DON shifts to NOA, there is an opportunity to expand competition to 
many suppliers including SBCs for separate components of the system (Bland, Busch, & 
Clark, 2008, p. 26).  There has been an expectation from the onset of NOA that the 
competition would be increased resulting in the decrease of cost due to increased 
competitive leverage, further, it was intended that the increase in competition would be 
generated by in large from the SBC.   
The SBIR program is limited in its scope and only provides an avenue of 
participation for the SBC in the form of R&D.  The addition of a SBC program that 
focusing entirely on R&D is not nearly comprehensive enough of a program to ensure the 
maximum participation of the SBC in NOA markets, including procurement.  The SBIR 
program does not ensure that the innovation being generated by the SBC will ever be 
fully funded (Phase III) and delivered to the DON.  The SBIR program while designed to 
be a catalyst to encourage SBC R&D should not be viewed as an instigator of SBC 
participation that increases competition in NOA markets.  As mentioned previously in 
this research, there is no guidance provided via the NOA Handbook or by virtue of a 
collection of associated regulations that spells out how the SBC will be utilized to 
encourage competition throughout the entire NOA enterprise.    
3. Small Business Act 
It is the policy of the United States that small-business concerns, shall 
have the maximum practicable opportunity to participate in the 
performance of contracts let by any Federal agency, including contracts 
and subcontracts for subsystems, assemblies, components, and related 
services for major systems.  (Small Business Act, 2008, p. 1) 
The NOA Handbook and the FAR both reference the Small Business Act (SBA) 
as a document that provides the various legal definitions of what Federal Agencies are to 
consider a SBC as well as guidance on the employment of the SBC.  As is the case with 
the FAR and NOA Handbook, the SBA as it applies to the SBC and competition is 
suggestive rather than directive guidance.  The suggestive tone of the SBA provides 
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Federal Agencies with flexibility in the interpretation of “maximum opportunity” for the 
SBC.  While flexibility in what constitutes the “maximum opportunity” for the SBC is a 
valuable tool that the DON uses to implement programs such as SBIR, the same 
allowance for flexibility in the interpretation of “maximum opportunity” introduces 
inconsistencies throughout the DoD on the employment of the SBC.  Irregularities on the 
employment of the SBC has led to inconsistencies in the application of DoD regulations 
that are put in place to ensure that participants are held accountable to standards and to 
certify that the SBC has fair opportunity to compete in NOA and DON markets.  The 
following excerpt from a 2012 report by the House Committee on Armed Services is an 
example of how inconsistencies in guidance impact accountability in contracting 
practices.  It was stated that participants (including primes) are not held accountable for 
compliance with their SBC contracting plans and will often swap out subcontractors after 
winning the contract (House Committee on Armed Services, 2012, p. 108).   
The SBA also provides a background on why it is of the utmost importance to the 
U.S. that the SBC is protected and properly represented in the federal market place to 
include NOA and DON markets.  The American economic system is built on full and free 
competition of free markets, free entry into business, and opportunities for the expression 
and growth of personal initiative and individual judgment is assured (Small Business Act, 
2008, p. 1).   
The preservation and expansion of such competition is basic not only to 
the economic well-being but to the security of this Nation.  Such security 
and well-being cannot be realized unless the actual and potential capacity 
of small business is encouraged and developed.  (Small Business Act, 
2008, p. 1)   
Rather than provide a framework of precedence in the form of directed and 
precise guidance to the DoD, the SBA just as the FAR and NOA Handbook is suggestive 
and does not adequately protect the SBC’s competitive opportunities.  The absence of 
directed guidance as it applies to SBC opportunities to compete has origins in the SBA 
and as a result subsquent guidance derived from the SBA suffers from a lack of pointed 
guidance that would provide real protection for the SBC.     
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4. Quotas 
It is widely publicized throughout the DoD/DON that there are quotas generated 
for each FY and that these quotas are designed to ensure the proper percent of SBC 
participation in NOA and DON markets.  Seen in Table 2 is the SBC target quotas 
generated by the DoD for FY 09-11, the target goal for FY12 was 22.5% for FY13 the 
target is 23%.  The government-wide prime contracting goal is currently 23 percent of all 
prime contract dollars (House Committee on Armed Services, 2012, p. 13). 
  
Table 2.   FY 2009-11 DoD SBC Goals 
(From House Committee on Armed Services, 2012, p. 81) 
These goals are used to ensure DoD/DON wide that there is a certain level of 
competition and participation attained by and through SBC involvement in federal 
markets.  The existence of goals indicates that the DON is cognizant of the necessity to 
include SBCs but what are fundamentally absent from these goals are the motives for 
selecting a specific number.  The presence of a goal along with suggestive FAR, NOA 
and SBA guidance to maximize opportunity for SBCs indicates that the DON considers 
twenty-three percent (FY13) to be the maximization of the opportunity for the SBC.  This 
type of pre-determined goal assigning demonstrates that the maximum opportunity for 
the SBC is somehow measured at the start of each FY.  The goal defines maximum SBC 
opportunity in the current practice rather than the end of year figures where the end of 
year percentage is a representation of the maximization of opportunity for the SBC. 
 29
The Defense Department failed to meet its goals for achieving competition in 
acquisition programs in fiscal year 2012 (Castelli, 2013, p. 1).  Castelli’s quote begs the 
question: Was the goal for FY12 too high?  The end-of-year figure should have been a 
representation, given the suggested guidance of the maximum opportunity for the SBC in 
the DoD Market.  So how can a goal ever be assigned?  The assigning of a goal seems 
arbitrary and seems to only provide a bench mark of achievement vs. the maximum 
opportunity for the SBC. 
F. SUMMARY 
There are various reports that exist that suggest the merits or failings of DON 
policy as it applies to the role of the SBC in NOA and DON markets.  However, existing 
research is by in large only supported or refuted by literature, there is little data analysis 
completed to substantiate or refute claims made in secondary literature.  Available data 
does not offer complete analysis of all purchases with small businesses (Edison, 
Grammich, Keating, & Moore, 2011, p. xii).  This research is a study of the role of the 
SBC in NOA and DON markets using data collected in Chapter III and analyzed in 
Chapter IV to fill gaps presented in literature review in Chapter II.   
The literature review is a five section evaluation of: NOA guidance for the 
utilization of the SBC, the role of the SBC in NOA and DON markets, the weaknesses in 
existing literature, barriers (real or perceived) to SBC entry and the protection that is 
provided to the SBC through law and policy.   
Section one begins with a look at the NOA Handbook to determine the extent of 
the association of the SBC, NOA strategy, innovation and competition.  Reviewing the 
handbook and the principles that provide the foundation of NOA establishes the intended 
role of the SBC as a source of increased competition in NOA markets.   
Sections two and three of the review focused on intended the role of the SBC in 
NOA and DON markets through various reports.  The usefulness of these sections of the 
review is that it demonstrates the conflicted thought on what the SBC should provide to 
the DON, specifically in NOA markets.  These sections set the stage for what are 
considered to be barriers to SBC entry to NOA and DON markets. 
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Section four of the review discusses the barriers to entry that the SBC could 
potentially encounter while participating or deciding to participate in NOA and DON 
markets.  The specific barriers discussed are design disclosure, prime contractor practices 
and how risk influences the decisions of the DON and the SBC as they apply to SBC 
participation.  Design disclosure speaks to the apprehensive nature of the SBC due to 
DON Requirements to disclose potentially sensitive information to the DON and 
potentially to competitors in order to participate in NOA and DON markets.  Review of 
prime contractor practices was conducted in order to describe an environment that would 
cause the SBC to decide not to participate in the NOA and DON markets.  It may also be 
the case that many small businesses are simply not interested in government procurement 
(Edison et al., 2011, p. xii).  The prime contractor practices section provides an 
understanding on why it is important to maximize SBCs as prime contractors, not only 
for the DON (increase competition) but for the SBC (not beholden to typical prime 
practices).  Last, in section four there is a barrier to entry that is attributed to the DON’s 
aversion to risk; this section explores the idea of a recurring relationship between the 
DON and specific providers as a risk mitigation tool that has been implemented by the 
DON that results in the elimination of potential competition through biases.   
The last section of Chapter II focuses on the major protective guidance and quota 
for the SBC in NOA and DON markets.  The FAR, NOA Handbook and SBA all play an 
important role in the utilization of the SBC in NOA and DON markets.  It is interesting 
that all of the reviewed guidance is suggestive and leaves room for agency or department 
interpretation in the execution of SBC guidance.  The suggestive nature of the 
documentation can in some cases be positive for the SBC and at other times a catalyst for 
questionable practices that decrease the SBC’s opportunity to participate.  Lastly the use 
of quotas as guidance and the impact of pre-determined quotas are discussed to raise the 
question of just how much participation is considered maximum participation of the SBC 
in NOA and DON markets.   
The primary focus of this research is to challenge or substantiate the claims made 
in reference to NOA barriers and provide options to maximize SBC participation in NOA 
and DON markets.  The idea that there are barriers that prevent participation by all 
interested and qualified candidates suggests that the DON is not capitalizing on the 
potential of an increase relationship with the SBC. 
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III. DATA, PROFILE AND ANALYSIS OF DON/NOA/ADP 
CONTRACTS AND PARTICIPANTS  
A. METHODS AND RESEARCH INTRODUCTION 
In order to understand the impact the small-business concern (SBC) has on Naval 
Open Architecture (NOA) via competition, claims made by both supporters and 
opponents must be explored through real market data.  The actual market available for 
the SBC to make a contribution must first be established and legitimatized through a 
study of NOA and Department of the Navy (DON) market awards.  Existing research has 
yet to focus on primary and niche NOA and DON markets in order to comprehensively 
explore the barriers to entry and options to facilitate SBC participation in NOA as well as 
the entire DON market.  The analysis of the entire DON market, all product service codes 
(PSC) will allow for a considerable amount of data to be compared and contrasted to 
NOA (Advanced Data Processing [ADP]/Information Technology [IT]/ 
Telecommunications [TELECOM]) Markets and ADP (ADP Software) Markets.  This 
comparison will be used in an effort to establish a baseline of typical SBC participation in 
both primary and niche NOA and DON markets.  It is only after this baseline has been 
established the determination of whether or not NOA does increase competition via the 
SBC thus delivering on its founding principles, namely increased competition, decreased 
costs and a maximization of innovation.  Operational baselines determined by award data, 
company profiles and market characteristics will allow the DON and SBCs to clearly 
understand how well NOA practices and policy are increasing SBC participation when 
compared to SBC participation in non NOA markets (DON markets).  It is imperative 
that the characteristics typical to recurring awardees are understood in order to provide 
SBCs with a reference to follow in becoming a competitive DON prime contractor.  
The analysis of prime contracts is important to this research in order to observe 
the opportunity for a single source SBC to be awarded a substantial prime contract that 
not only accounts for a considerable amount of money but just as importantly allows the 
SBC to maintain some degree of innovative independence through the self-sufficiency 
gained as a prime contractor.  A single sourced SBC prime contractor is characteristically 
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removed from the considerable influence large corporations retain over subcontracted 
SBCs.  This autonomy affords the SBC greater opportunity to self-govern resulting in an 
added innovation and flexibility to the DON.    
Initial data for this research was collected from www.defense.gov/contracts and 
www.usaspending.gov.  The data collected from www.defense.gov/contracts focused on 
DON market (all PSCs) awarded to large and SBC prime contractors where the awards 
were $6.5M or greater.  Due to Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DFARS) subpart 205.303, Announcement of Awards, paragraph a, section 1, revised 
2010, requires that the DoD report all contractual actions, including modifications, which 
have a face value, excluding unexercised options, of more than $6.5M are reported daily 
via a public announcement (Department of Defense, 1998, pp. 205.3-1). 
Data was collected on both large prime contractors and SBC prime contractors.  
This data was collected over the span of the 2012 Fiscal Year through data extraction 
from the summary of daily contracts awarded by the DON.  The researcher focused on 
the amount of the contract, the size of the company (large corporation or SBC) awarded 
the contract and the date of the award.  This information was then entered in to a database 
that provided the foundation for the researcher to conduct an analysis of DON contract 
behavior.  The analysis of the contract data was used to substantiate or refute claims in 
existing literature that suggest barriers that may or may not exist to the SBC in 
participating in the NOA and DON market  
The analysis of the www.defense.gov/contracts data yielded trends associated 
with the contracting behavior of the DON in DON markets when utilizing both large and 
SBC prime contractors.  From the derived database the top five large prime contractors 
and top five SBC prime contractors were determined by the total amount awarded to the a 
specific company.  These recurring top awardees generated the first of several company 
profile lists that would be used to establish commonalities among persistent award 
winners both large and SBC primes.  The common characteristics among these top 
companies provided the researcher with an opportunity to compare not only like size 
companies (SBC vs. SBC) or (large vs. large) but also the characteristics common to both 
large and SBC primes.  Trends and characteristics discovered were then used to 
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substantiate or refute claimed barriers to entry and to formulate potential options to 
facilitate SBC participation in NOA as well as DON markets.   
To gather the same data on DON contracts from ranging from  $1–$6.49M in the 
DON market that are not legally obligated to be publically announced data was collected 
and analyzed from www.usaspending.gov.  The use of www.usaspending.gov data also 
allowed for research to focus on specific areas of interest used to explore the SBC role 
specific to NOA.  The data collected from www.usaspending.com was similar to the data 
initial data collected from www.defense.gov/contracts and yields the number of contracts 
awarded to large and SBC prime contractor and the dollar amount of the award 
(combined total as well as per company total).  The prime award advanced search 
function on the website was conducted by performing the search using the following 
criteria:  
 Spending Type–Contracts 
 Department/Agency–9700 (DoD); 1700 (DON); 1795 (DON) 
 Federal Spending–$1-6.49M; $6.5M-empty set 
 Fiscal Year–2012 
 Contractor Type–blank = large prime; * = SBC 
*It must be pointed out that for the purposes of the research conducted on 
www.usaspending.gov the term SBC was represented in an advanced search as contract 
type that included the following: 
 8A Firm 
 American-Indian Owned 
 Asian-Pacific American Owned 
 Black-American Owned 
 Emerging Small Business 
 Hispanic-American Owned 
 Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) Firm 
 Minority Owned 
 Native-American Owned 
 Service Disabled Veteran Owned 
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 Small Business 
 Small Disadvantaged Business 
 Sub-continent Asian (Asian-Indian) American Owned 
 Veteran Owned 
 Women Owned  
 PSC–All unchecked = DON market; 70 & D = NOA market; 7030 = ADP 
Market (Software)     
Collecting data from www.usaspending.gov was done in order to collect similar 
data to be used to compare the information found on the two websites.  The findings 
reported by these databases are similar despite the use of different terms.  The data 
collected from www.usaspending.gov similar to www.defense.gov/contracts included a 
list of the top awardees for a given market.  After collecting the data on for all contracts 
of a $1 or more awarded by the DON in FY12; the NOA market data was collected and 
analyzed, this data was split into four categories, NOA Large primes over $6.5M, NOA 
SBC Prime over $6.5M, NOA Large primes $1–6.49M and NOA SBC 
Primes $1–6.49M.  Research focused on the amount of the awards and the top awardees 
for each category.  Specifically this research focused on all contracts awarded by the 
DON to both large and SBC prime contractors that fell under the product service codes 
(PSC) 70 (Advanced Data Processing) and D (Information 
Technology/Telecommunications).  Collecting data on the NOA market allowed for a 
comparison of the role of the SBC in both the DON market (all products and services) vs. 
the NOA market (ADP, IT/TELECOM) to find out if one market was more favorable for 
SBC participation.  The top producers in each market both large and SBC primes were 
then analyzed to provide company profiles used to generalize business characteristics of 
highly successful DON contract awardees.   
To provide more clarity on SBC participation data was drawn on a specific niche 
NOA market, ADP market (software).  The ADP market was examined and split into the 
same four categories as the DON market and NOA markets to provide a review of the 
role of intellectual property on the SBC’s participation in technology markets.  This 
analysis also considered the innovation gained by the DON through utilization of SBCs.  
The ADP data was compared to previously collected data on the NOA market as well as 
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the DON market, seeking trends in awardee characteristics as well as to determine if 
there was a greater propensity by the DON to award the SBC contracts in smaller more 
technological dependent applications that typically are enhanced through the innovative 
environment of the SBC.   
The use of all of the collected data and all of the analysis is to provide an 
understanding of the characteristics that are common among top DON recurring award 
winners.  This is an opportunity for the SBC to model their DON business strategies after 
successful prime contractors and establishes a foundation to provide options to facilitate 
SBC participation in NOA and DON markets.  This research was also used to establish a 
baseline of typical SBC participation in the entire DON market, once established this 
baseline was compared to NOA and ADP markets to determine if the SBC played a more 
or less prevalent role in NOA contracting (as NOA principles suggest) vs. DON 
contracting.   
Analysis of federal contract data was used to determine whether there is a lack of 
SBC participation for DoD prime contracts independent of the service or product the 
SBC provided.  The culmination of the data allowed the researcher to determine if the 
SBC is underutilized by the DON and to determine if NOA increases the likelihood that a 
SBC will participate for prime DON contracts.  If claims of barriers are validated, this 
research will be used to form a foundation of suggestions on how to increase SBC 
participation in NOA and DON markets.  If claims of barriers are contested this research 
will be used to assist the DON to overcome the perception of barriers to enter NOA and 
DON markets.   
Retrieved from the Office of Small Business Programs (OSBP), the DoD goal for 
SBC prime contract monetary award for FY 2012 was twenty-two and half percent 
(Office of Small Business Programs, 2013).  This will used as an initial benchmark to 
determine if a certain markets are succeeding in meeting prime contract goals.   
Analysis in this chapter will focus on understanding if NOA is working as 
intended and allowing the DON to benefit from decreased costs and the maximization of 
potential innovation through increased SBC participation.  This analysis will provide the 
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insight that is critical to understand the role of the SBC order to eliminate real or 
perceived barriers to entry to the federal market place and the options to facilitate 
increased SBC participation.  
B. DON CONTRACTS $6.5M OR HIGHER LARGE PRIME 
CONTRACTORS  
1. Market Summary 
In Fiscal Year (FY) 2012, the DON spent a total of $66.5B on contracts for the 
DON market (all PSCs) where each individual contract was for $6.5M or greater (U.S. 
Department of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Public Affairs], 
2013).  Contracts in excess of $6.5M awarded to large prime contractors in the DON 
market accounted for a majority of the all the awards in this category.  After reviewing 
the data it is noted that large primes accounted for $58.3B of this award or eighty-eight 
percent of the total award.  Large primes were awarded 1,015 contracts in excess of 
$6.5M for FY12 (U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense [Public Affairs], 2013).  Of the 1,015 contracts awarded by the DON to large 
primes in this category, 330 of the contracts were awarded to the top five large primes 
(U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Public 
Affairs], 2013).  The top five large prime contractors were awarded thirty-two percent of 
the total number of awarded contracts by the DON in this category.  
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 Large Prime Contracts $6.5M or Greater Awarded vs. Total DON Awards Figure 1. 
$6.5M or Greater FY12   
The top five large primes account for $26.5B of the total large prime award for 
this category and this constitutes forty-five percent of the eligible monetary award went 
to the top five companies.  The data collected in this section produce results that suggest 
that the majority of the DON market is consistently awarded to a select few large primes.  
Figure 2 represents the top five awardees as a percentage of the total DON award that 
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 Top 5 Large Prime Award for Contracts $6.5M or Greater as a Percentage Figure 2. 
 of Total DON Award of Contracts $6.5M or Greater DON Market  
2. Profiles 
The top five companies in this category along with the total dollar amount 
awarded to each company for FY12 are provided in Table 3.  The following section is a 
brief profile of each company considered to be a top performer for this specific category.  
The purpose of this section is to highlight certain data in order to establish typical 
behaviors and business characteristics that are shared by the top performers for this 














Top 5 Large Primes Awarded FY12 as a % 









6.5M for the 
FY12 went 




Table 3.   Top 5 Large Primes for Contracts $6.5M or Greater DON Market Amount 
Awarded 
a. BAE Systems, INC. 
BAE Systems, INC. is classified as a provider of navigation, search 
equipment and aircraft parts and equipment (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth 
Records, 2013).  The reported net sales of BAE are $14.4B for FY12 and BAE has 
43,000 employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
BAE’s total FY 12 Contracts for the DON market $6.5M or greater was 58 
awards (U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Public 
Affairs], 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, independent of a specific dollar 
amounts or PSCs, BAE was awarded 4,811 contracts by the DoD (United States 
Government, 2013).  BAE’s history with the DoD/DON dates back over a decade and the 
annual award total has ranged from hundreds of million dollars to annual DoD awards 
over a billion dollars (United States Government, 2013).     
BAE is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that possesses a great 
deal of intellectual property.  BAE has submitted 143 patents in the United States in the 
past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  BAE and has consistently benefitted as evidenced by 
increasing DoD/DON award totals each year from diversified and prolonged participation 
in DON markets.    
b. Huntington Ingalls Industries, INC. 
Huntington Ingalls Industries, INC. is classified as a ship-building and 
repair provider (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The reported net 
sales of Huntington Ingalls are $6.2B for FY12 and Huntington Ingalls has 38,000 
employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
Company Total Award FY 2012
Lockheed Martin Corporation $11,229,342,615
Huntington Ingalls Industries, INC. $5,677,939,464
The Boeing Company $3,964,886,119
Raytheon Company $3,085,809,225
BAE Systems, INC. $2,541,519,632
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Huntington Ingalls’ total FY 12 Contracts for the DON market $6.5M or 
greater was 33 awards (U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense [Public Affairs], 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, independent of a 
specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Huntington Ingalls was awarded 2,485 contracts by the 
DoD (United States Government, 2013).  Huntington Ingalls history with the DoD/DON 
dates back over a decade (as Newport News and Ship Systems) and the annual award 
provided by the DoD has annually exceeded more than a billion dollars (United States 
Government, 2013).     
Huntington Ingalls is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that does 
not rely on a great deal of intellectual property.  Huntington Ingalls has not submitted any 
patents in the United States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  Huntington Ingalls 
and has consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each 
year from diversified and prolonged participation in DON markets.    
c. Lockheed Martin Corporation 
The Lockheed Martin Corporation is classified as a provider of aircraft, 
aircraft manufacturing, aircraft parts and equipment (Hoover's Company Records - In-
depth Records, 2013).  The reported net sales of Lockheed Martin are $46.5B for FY12 
and Lockheed has 123,000 employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
Lockheed’s total FY 12 Contracts for the DON market $6.5M or greater 
was 101 awards (U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense [Public Affairs], 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, independent of a 
specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Lockheed was awarded 13,454 contracts by the DoD 
(United States Government, 2013).  Lockheed’s history with the DoD/DON dates back 
over a decade and the annual award total awarded by the DoD has annually been in the 
billions of dollars (United States Government, 2013).     
Lockheed Martin is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that 
possesses a great deal of intellectual property.  Lockheed Martin has submitted 100 
patents in the United States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  Lockheed Martin 
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has consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year 
from diversified and prolonged participation in DON markets.    
d. Raytheon Company 
The Raytheon Company is classified as a provider of navigation, search 
equipment and communications equipment (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth 
Records, 2013).  The reported net sales of Raytheon are $24.8B for FY12 and Raytheon 
has 71,000 employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
Raytheon’s total FY 12 Contracts for the DON market $6.5M or greater 
was 79 awards (U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
[Public Affairs], 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, independent of a specific 
dollar amounts or PSCs, Raytheon was awarded 9,475 contracts by the DoD (United 
States Government, 2013).  Raytheon’s history with the DoD/DON dates back over a 
decade and consistently annual awards made by the DoD have been in billions of dollars 
(United States Government, 2013).     
Raytheon is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that possesses a 
great deal of intellectual property.  Raytheon has submitted 143 patents in the United 
States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  Raytheon and has consistently 
benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year from diversified 
and prolonged participation in DON markets.    
e. The Boeing Company 
The Boeing Company is classified as a provider of aircraft and aircraft 
manufacturing (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The reported net 
sales of Boeing are $68.7B for FY12 and Boeing has 171,700 employees (Global Duns 
Market Identifiers, 2012).   
Boeing’s total FY 12 Contracts for the DON market $6.5M or greater was 
59 awards (U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
[Public Affairs], 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, independent of a specific 
dollar amounts or PSCs, Boeing was awarded 10,350 contracts by the DoD (United 
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States Government, 2013).  Boeing’s history with the DoD/DON dates back over a 
decade and the annual award made by the DoD total has consistently been in billions of 
dollars (United States Government, 2013).     
Boeing is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that possesses a great 
deal of intellectual property.  Boeing has submitted 271 patents in the United States in the 
past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  Boeing and has consistently benefitted as evidenced 
by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year from diversified and prolonged 
participation in DON markets.    
3. Analysis 
a. Design Disclosure Barrier 
Analysis of the large prime DON market where each individual contract 
was for $6.5M or greater suggests that there is a link between the number of patents 
submitted in the past two years and the net sales of the individual large prime. 
The Boeing Company leads the top five in this category with $68.7B in net sales and 271 
patents submitted and Huntington Ingalls is ranked five of five with $6.2B in net sales 
and did not submit any patents.  Eighty percent of the large primes awarded in this 
category are companies that have submitted over 100 patents in the US the past two 
years.  Despite evidence to suggest that there is a link between intellectual property 
(patents) and net sales, there is no evidence to suggest that large primes are negatively 
impacted by design disclosure barriers that require disclosure of intellectual property to 
the DON.   
b. Risk Mitigation Barrier 
Each of the five large primes profiled in this category have established 
relationships with the DON that have been occurring for a decade and in some cases 
occurring for decades.  This ongoing relationship suggests that there is evidence of the 
DON being risk adverse to new competition and as a result the DON consistently awards 
contracts to a limited number of recurring large primes in the DON market.  The DON 
awarded thirty-two percent of the total number of awards and forty-five percent of the 
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total dollar award to the top five large primes.  Conversely, all other large primes were 
awarded sixty-eight percent of the total number of awards (685 awards) and fifty-five 
percent of the total dollar award ($32B).  The DON’s risk adverse practices are evident 
not only in the recurrence of use of the same prime contractors for over a decade(s) but 
these practices are also made evident through the significant reliance on only a few large 
primes for this category.    
c. Prime Practices Barrier 
There is evidence in this category of prime practices that prevent 
competition.  The top five large primes in this category each experienced increasing 
award totals over the past decade.  This behavior indicates that there is a propensity for 
large primes to consistently seek more contract awards and to be awarded at an increasing 
rate as the fluency with DoD/DON business practices increases.   
This prime practice barrier behavior is influenced by the design disclosure 
barrier and the risk mitigation barrier.  As large primes are deemed less risk adverse 
(through recurring relationships) with the DoD/DON there appears to be a link to 
increased awards for top providers.  Increased award totals allow large primes to have 
more exposure to what intellectual property has been previously divulged by other 
companies due to disclosure requirements.  The evidence of continued increases in 
annual award amounts to a limited number of top large primes indicates that the large 
prime is able to capitalize on limited competition, through typical prime practices that 
constitute prime practice barriers to potential new competitors.   
C. DON CONTRACTS $6.5M OR HIGHER SBC PRIME CONTRACTORS 
1. Market Summary 
The DON spent a total of $66.5B on contracts for the DON market (all PSCs) 
where each individual contract was for $6.5M or greater (U.S. Department of Defense 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Public Affairs], 2013).  Contracts in excess 
of $6.5M awarded to SBC Prime Contractors in the DON market accounted for only 
three percent of all the awards in this category.  After reviewing the data it is noted that 
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SBC Primes accounted for $2.3B of this award or three percent of the total award.  SBC 
Primes were awarded 137 contracts in excess of $6.5M for FY12 (U.S. Department of 
Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Public Affairs], 2013).  Of the 137 
contracts awarded by the DON to SBC Primes in this category 23 of the contracts were 
awarded to the top five SBC Primes (U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense [Public Affairs], 2013).  The top five SBC Prime Contractors were 
awarded seventeen percent of the total number of awarded contracts by the DON in this 
category.  
 
 SBC Prime Contracts $6.5M or Greater Awarded vs. Figure 3. 
 Total DON Awards $6.5M or Greater FY12   
The top five SBC Primes account for $434M of the total SBC Prime award for 
this category and this constitutes nineteen percent of the eligible monetary award went to 
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that the DON offers contracts to diverse group of SBC Primes in the DON market.  
Figure 4 represents the top five awardees as a percentage of the total DON award that 
went to SBC Primes in this category. 
 
 Top 5 SBC Award for Contracts $6.5M or Greater as a Percentage Figure 4. 
of Total DON Award of Contracts $6.5M or Greater awarded to all SBCs  
2. Profiles 
The top five companies in this category along with the total dollar amount 
awarded to each company for FY12 are provided in Table 4.  The following section is a 
brief profile of each company considered to be a top performer for this specific category.  
The purpose of this section is to highlight certain data in order to establish typical 
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Table 4.   Top 5 SBCs for Prime Contracts over $6.5M or Greater DON 
market Amount Awarded 
a. AGVIQ LLC INC. 
AGVIQ, LLC INC. is classified as a business and environmental 
consulting service (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The reported 
net sales AGVIQ are $6.2M for FY12 and AGVIQ has 60 employees (Global Duns 
Market Identifiers, 2012).   
AGVIQ’s total FY 12 Contracts for the DON market $6.5M or greater was 
three awards (U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
[Public Affairs], 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, independent of a specific 
dollar amounts or PSCs, AGVIQ was awarded 123 contracts by the DoD (United States 
Government, 2013).  AGVIQ’s history with the DoD/DON dates back over a decade and 
the annual award total has ranged from $2.8M in 2000 to $40.1M in 2012 (United States 
Government, 2013).     
AGVIQ is a recurring DoD/DON partner that does not rely on a great deal 
of intellectual property.  AGVIQ has not submitted any patents in the United States in the 
past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  AGVIQ and has consistently benefitted as evidenced 
by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year from diversified and prolonged 
participation in DON markets.    
b. NAVMAR Applied Sciences Corporation 
NAVMAR Applied Sciences Corporation is classified as a provider of 
commercial physical research and engineering services (Hoover's Company Records - In-
Company Amount Awarded
NAVMAR Applied Sciences Corporation $126,334,282
AGVIQ LLC., INC. $119,801,722
Neany INC. $86,533,288
Progeny Systems Corporation $56,193,031
TCOM LLP $45,085,797
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depth Records, 2013).  The reported net sales of NAVMAR are $27.2M for FY12 and 
NAVMAR has 170 employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
NAVMAR’s total FY 12 Contracts for the DON market $6.5M or greater 
was five awards (U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense [Public Affairs], 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, independent of a 
specific dollar amounts or PSCs, NAVMAR was awarded 121 contracts by the DoD.  
(United States Government, 2013).  NAVMAR’s history with the DoD/DON dates back 
over a decade and the annual award total has ranged from $12M in 2000 to $233.8M in 
2012 (United States Government, 2013).     
NAVMAR is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that does not 
possess a great deal of intellectual property.  NAVMAR has not submitted any patents in 
the United States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  NAVMAR and has 
consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year 
from diversified and prolonged participation in DON markets.    
c. Neany INC. 
Neany INC. is classified as a provider of navigation and search equipment 
(Hoover's Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The reported net sales of Neany 
are $7.4M for FY12 and Neany has 51 employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 
2012).   
Neany’s total FY 12 Contracts for the DON market $6.5M or greater was 
seven awards (U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
[Public Affairs], 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, independent of a specific 
dollar amounts or PSCs, Neany was awarded 43 contracts by the DoD (United States 
Government, 2013).  Neany’s history with the DoD/DON dates back to 2004, the annual 
award total has ranged from $2M in 2004 to $117.7M in 2012 (United States 
Government, 2013).     
Neany is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that does not possess a 
great deal of intellectual property.  Neany has not submitted any patents in the United 
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States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  Neany and has consistently benefitted 
as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year from diversified and 
prolonged participation in DON markets.    
d. Progeny Systems Corporation 
The Progeny Systems Corporation is classified as a provider of computer 
integrated systems design and computer peripheral equipment (Hoover's Company 
Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The reported net sales of Progeny are $50M for 
FY12 and Progeny has 148 employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
Progeny’s total FY 12 Contracts for the DON market $6.5M or greater 
was four awards (U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense [Public Affairs], 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, independent of a 
specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Progeny was awarded 246 contracts by the DoD (United 
States Government, 2013).  Progeny’s history with the DoD/DON dates back over a 
decade and the annual award total has ranged from $5.8M in 2000 to $100.9M in 2012 
(United States Government, 2013).     
Progeny is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that possesses some 
intellectual property.  Progeny has submitted two patents in the United States in the past 
24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  Progeny and has consistently benefitted as evidenced by 
increasing DoD/DON award totals each year from diversified and prolonged participation 
in DON markets.    
e. TCOM LLP 
TCOM LLP is classified as a provider of engineering services (Hoover's 
Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The reported net sales of TCOM are $114 
for FY12 and TCOM has 337 employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
TCOM’s total FY 12 Contracts for the DON market $6.5M or greater was 
four awards (U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
[Public Affairs], 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, independent of a specific 
dollar amounts or PSCs, TCOM was awarded 43 contracts by the DoD (United States 
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Government, 2013).  TCOM’s history with the DoD/DON dates back a decade and the 
annual award total has ranged from $3.3M in 2002 to $82M in 2012 (United States 
Government, 2013).   
TCOM is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that does not possess 
a great deal of intellectual property.  TCOM has not submitted any patents in the United 
States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  TCOM and has consistently benefitted 
as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year from diversified and 
prolonged participation in DON markets.    
3. Analysis 
a. Design Disclosure Barrier 
The SBC Prime DON market where each individual contract was for 
$6.5M or greater suggests that there is a link between the number of patents submitted in 
the past two years and the number of awards awarded to the top SBCs.  Progeny was the 
only company to have submitted a patent in the past two years (both IT related) that 
ranked in the top five SBC Primes for this category.  The majority of the top SBCs in this 
category did not submit patents in the past two years; this suggests that to be a successful 
the SBC in this category the company does not need to rely heavily on the use of 
intellectual property.  This behavior may also suggest that the preference of the 
companies who possess or rely heavily on intellectual property is to not participate in 
DON markets.  Therefore a design disclosure barrier for this category is a distinct 
possibility.   
b. Risk Mitigation Barrier 
Four of the five SBC Primes profiled in this category have established 
relationships with the DoD/DON that have been occurring for a decade or more.  This 
ongoing relationship suggests that there is evidence of the DON being risk adverse and 
consistently awarding contracts to a limited number of recurring SBC Primes.  However, 
there is data to suggest that the SBC Market is awarded on a relatively competitive basis 
despite evidence of a limited risk mitigation barrier.  The DON awarded seventeen 
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percent of the total number of awards and nineteen percent of the total dollar award to the 
top five SBC Primes.  Conversely, all other SBC Primes were awarded eighty-three 
percent of the total number of awards and eighty-one percent of the total dollar award.  
The DON’s risk-adverse practices are evident in the recurring of the same prime 
contractors for over a decade; however, these practices do not appear to present barriers 
to competition in this category.   
c. Prime Practices Barrier 
There is evidence in this category of prime practices that negatively 
impact competition creating a prime practice barrier.  The top five SBC Primes in this 
category each experienced increasing award totals over the course of the years business 
has been conducted with the DoD/DON.  This behavior indicates that there is a 
propensity for SBC Primes to consistently seek more contract awards and to be awarded 
at an increasing rate as the familiarity to DoD/DON business practices increases.     
D. NOA CONTRACTS $6.5M OR HIGHER LARGE PRIME 
CONTRACTORS 
1. Market Summary 
The DON spent a total of $1.767B on contracts for the NOA market (PSCs 70 & 
D) where each individual contract was for $6.5M or greater (United States Government, 
2013).  Contracts in excess of $6.5M awarded to large prime contractors in the NOA 
market accounted for a majority of the all the awards in this category.  After reviewing 
the data it is noted that large primes accounted for $1.737B of this award or ninety-seven 
percent of the total award.  Large primes were awarded 75 contracts in excess of $6.5M 
for FY12 (United States Government, 2013).  Of the 75 contracts awarded by the DON to 
large primes in this category 48 of the contracts were awarded to the top five large primes 
(United States Government, 2013).  The top five large prime contractors were awarded 
sixty-four percent of the total number of awarded contracts by the DON in this category.  
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 Large Prime Contracts Greater Than $6.5M vs. Total Award NOA Market Figure 5. 
The top five large primes account for $1.4B of the total large prime award for this 
category and this constitutes eighty-two percent of the eligible monetary award went to 
the top five companies.  The data collected in this section produce results that suggest 
that the majority of the NOA market is consistently awarded to a select few large primes.  
Figure 6 represents the top five awardees as a percentage of the total NOA award that 
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 Top 5 Large Primes Awarded FY12 as a Percentage of Total Large Award Figure 6. 
 $6.5M or Greater NOA Market 
2. Profiles 
The top five companies in this category along with the total dollar amount 
awarded to each company for FY12 are provided in Table 5.  The following section is a 
brief profile of each company considered to be a top performer for this specific category.  
The purpose of this section is to highlight certain data in order to establish typical 
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Table 5.   Top 5 Large Primes $6.5M or Greater NOA Market Amount Awarded 
a. Hewlett-Packard Company 
The Hewlett-Packard Company is classified as a provider of electronic 
computers, computer storage devices, computer peripheral equipment, investment advice, 
computer programming services, pre-packaged software, computer integrated systems 
design, data processing and preparation and computer related services (Hoover's 
Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The reported net sales of Hewlett-Packard 
are $120.3B for FY12 and Hewlett Packard has 324,600 employees (Global Duns Market 
Identifiers, 2012).   
Hewlett-Packard’s total FY 12 contracts for the NOA market $6.5M or 
greater was 26 awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD 
agencies, independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Hewlett-Packard was 
awarded 2,379 contracts by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  Hewlett-
Packard’s history with the DoD/DON dates back over a decade and the annual award 
total has ranged from $14.7M in 2000 to $138.3M in 2012 (United States Government, 
2013). 
Hewlett-Packard is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that 
possesses a great deal of intellectual property.  Hewlett-Packard has submitted 288 
patents in the United States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  Hewlett-Packard 
has consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year 
from diversified and prolonged participation in NOA markets.    
Company Amount Awarded
Hewlett-Packard Company $1,073,526,647
Northrop Grumman Company $120,519,650
SAIC, INC. $88,924,896
Oracle Corporation $67,838,701
General Dynamics Corporation $63,257,865
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b. Northrop Grumman Corporation 
The Northrop Grumman Corporation is classified as a provider of 
navigation, search equipment and aircraft parts and equipment (Hoover's Company 
Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The reported net sales of Northrop Grumman are 
$26.4B for FY12 and Northrop Grumman has 72,500 employees (Global Duns Market 
Identifiers, 2012).   
Northrop Grumman’s total FY 12 Contracts for the NOA market $6.5M or 
greater was five awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD 
agencies, independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Northrop Grumman was 
awarded 11,763 contracts by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  Northrop 
Grumman’s history with the DoD/DON dates back over a decade and the annual award 
totals have consistently been in the billions of dollars (United States Government, 2013).     
Northrop Grumman is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that 
possesses intellectual property.  Northrop Grumman has submitted 36 patents in the 
United States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  Northrop Grumman and has 
consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year 
from diversified and prolonged participation in NOA markets.    
c. SAIC INC. 
SAIC INC. is classified as a provider of computer integrated system 
design, electrical work, computer programming services, pre-packaged software, 
computer related services and engineering services (Hoover's Company Records - In-
depth Records, 2013).  The reported net sales of SAIC are $10.6B for FY12 and SAIC 
has 41,100 employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
SAIC’s total FY 12 contracts for the NOA market $6.5M or greater was 
six awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, 
independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, SAIC was awarded 6,425 contracts by 
the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  SAIC’s history with the DoD/DON dates 
back over a decade and the annual award total has ranged from $281.6M in 2000 to 
$3.4B in 2012 (United States Government, 2013). 
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SAIC is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that possesses limited 
intellectual property.  SAIC has submitted three patents in the United States in the past 24 
months (LexisNexis, 2013).  SAIC and has consistently benefitted as evidenced by 
increasing DoD/DON award totals each year from diversified and prolonged participation 
in NOA markets.    
d. Oracle Corporation 
The Oracle Corporation classified as a provider of pre-packaged software, 
electronic computers, computer storage devices, computer programming services and 
computer integrated systems design (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth Records, 
2013).  The reported net sales of Oracle are $37.1B for FY12 and Oracle has 115,000 
employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
Oracle’s total FY 12 Contracts for the NOA market $6.5M or greater was 
six awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, 
independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Oracle was awarded 1,051 contracts by 
the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  Oracle’s history with the DoD/DON dates 
back over a decade and the annual awards have consistently been in the hundreds of 
millions of dollars (United States Government, 2013).  
Oracle is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that possesses a great 
deal of intellectual property.  Oracle has submitted 268 patents in the United States in the 
past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  Oracle has consistently benefitted as evidenced by 
increasing DoD/DON award totals each year from diversified and prolonged participation 
in NOA markets. 
e. General Dynamics Corporation 
The General Dynamics Corporation is classified as a ship-building and 
repair provider (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The reported net 
sales of General Dynamics are $32.7B for FY12 and General Dynamics has 95,100 
employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
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General Dynamics’ total FY 12 Contracts for the NOA market $6.5M or 
greater was five awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD 
agencies, independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, General Dynamics was 
awarded 8,961 contracts by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  General 
Dynamics’ history with the DoD/DON dates back over a decade and the annual award 
total has been consistently in billions of dollars (United States Government, 2013).     
General Dynamics is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that 
possesses limited intellectual property.  General Dynamics has submitted nine patents in 
the United States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  General Dynamics and has 
consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year 
from diversified and prolonged participation in NOA markets.  
3. Analysis 
a. Design Disclosure Barrier 
The large prime NOA market where each individual contract was for 
$6.5M or greater suggests that there is a link between the number of patents submitted in 
the past two years and the successfulness of the top five large primes in this category.  
Each large prime in the top five of this category has submitted patents in the past two 
years.  The three IT classified companies (Hewlett-Packard, SAIC and Oracle) accounted 
for ninety-three percent of the patents submitted by the top five large primes in this 
category.  This behavior suggests that large IT classified companies are especially 
dependent upon intellectual property in the NOA market.   
This evidence points to a necessity for would be large primes to possess a 
significant amount of intellectual property in order to be a viable competitor in this 
category of the NOA market.  There is no evidence to suggest that current top large 
primes are negatively impacted by design disclosure barriers that require disclosure of 
intellectual property to the DON. 
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b. Risk Mitigation Barrier 
Each of the five large primes profiled in this category have established 
relationships with the DoD/DON that have been occurring for a decade and in some cases 
occurring for decades.  This ongoing relationship suggests that there is evidence of the 
DON being risk adverse and consistently awarding contracts to a limited number of 
recurring large primes.  The DON awarded sixty-four percent of the total number of 
awards and eighty-two percent of the total dollar award to the top five large primes.  
Conversely all other large primes were awarded thirty-six percent of the total number of 
awards and eighteen percent of the total dollar award.  The DON’s risk adverse practices 
are evident not only the recurrence in the use of the same prime contractors for over a 
decade but these practices are also made evident through the significant reliance on only 
a few large primes for this category.    
c. Prime Practices Barrier 
There is evidence in this category of prime practices that prevent 
competition.  The top top five large primes in this category each experienced increasing 
award totals over the past decade.  This one hundred percent behavior indicates that there 
is a propensity for large primes to consistently seek more contract awards and to be 
awarded at an increasing rate as the fluency to DoD/DON business practices increases.  
This behavior is also influenced by the design disclosure barrier and the risk mitigation 
barrier.  As large primes are deemed less risk adverse to the DoD/DON there appears to 
be a link to increased awards.  Additional business knowledge and award totals allow the 
large primes to have more exposure to what intellectual property has been divulged by 
other companies, a continued increase in award amounts indicates that the familiar large 
prime is able to capitalize on limited competition, through typical prime practices.  
E. NOA CONTRACTS $6.5M OR HIGHER SBC PRIME CONTRACTORS 
1. Market Summary 
The DON spent a total of $1.767B on contracts for the NOA market (PSCs 70 & 
D) where each individual contract was for $6.5M or greater (United States Government, 
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2013).  Contracts in excess of $6.5M awarded to SBC prime contractors in the NOA 
market accounted for a minority of the all the awards in this category.  After reviewing 
the data it is noted that SBC primes accounted for $46.5M of this award or three percent 
of the total award.  SBC Primes were awarded five contracts in excess of $6.5M for FY12 
(United States Government, 2013).  Of the five contracts awarded by the DON to SBC 
Primes in this category five of the contracts were awarded to the top four SBC Primes 
(United States Government, 2013).  The top four SBC Prime Contractors were awarded 
one hundred percent of the total number of awarded contracts by the DON in this 
category.  
 
 SBC Prime Contracts Greater Than $6.5M vs. Total Award NOA Market Figure 7. 
The top four SBC primes account for $46.5M of the total SBC prime award for 
this category and this constitutes one hundred percent of the eligible monetary award 
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suggest that the NOA market lacks competition provided by the participation of the SBC.  
This data allows suggests that the NOA SBC market lacks competitors.  Figure 8 
represents the top four awardees as a percentage of the total DON award that went to 
SBC primes in this category. 
 
 Top 4 SBC Primes Awarded FY12 as a Percentage of Total SBC Award Figure 8. 
 $6.5M or Greater NOA Market 
2. Profiles 
The top four companies in this category along with the total dollar amount 
awarded to each company for FY12 are provided in Table 6.  The following section is a 
brief profile of each company considered to be a top performer for this specific category.  
The purpose of this section is to highlight certain data in order to establish typical 
behaviors and business characteristics that are shared by the top performers for this 
category. 
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Table 6.   Top 4 SBC Primes Award $6.5M or Greater NOA Market Amount 
Awarded 
a. Bristol Bay Native Corporation 
The Bristol Bay Native Corporation classified as a provider of hotels and 
motels and is the parent company for numerous other holding companies (Hoover's 
Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The reported net sales of Bristol Bay are 
$1.2B for FY12 and Bristol Bay has 135 employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 
2012).   
Bristol Bay’s total FY 12 Contracts for the NOA market $6.5M or greater 
was two awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD 
agencies, independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Bristol Bay was awarded 25 
contracts by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  Bristol Bay’s history with the 
DoD/DON dates back over a decade and the annual award total has ranged from $27.9K 
in 2001 to $195.7K in 2012.   
Bristol Bay is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that does not 
possess a great deal of intellectual property.  Bristol Bay has not submitted any patents in 
the United States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  Bristol Bay and has 
consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year 
from diversified and prolonged participation in NOA markets.    
b. Impact Resources INC. 
Impact Resources INC. is classified as a provider of computer programing 
services (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The reported net sales 
of Impact Resources are $330K for FY12 and Impact Resources has seven employees 
(Global Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
Company Amount Awarded
Bristol Bay Native Corporation $22,582,954
Impact Resources INC. $9,562,047
Loui Consulting Group INC. $7,553,478
VRC INC. $6,882,359
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Impact Resources’ total FY 12 Contracts for the NOA market $6.5M or 
greater was one award (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD 
agencies, independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Impact Resources was 
awarded 22 contracts by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  Impact Resources’ 
history with the DoD/DON dates back a decade and the annual award total has ranged 
from $921.4K in 2002 to $18.3M in 2012 (United States Government, 2013).     
Impact Resources is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that does 
not possess a great deal of intellectual property.  Impact Resources has not submitted any 
patents in the United States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  Impact Resources 
and has consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each 
year from diversified and prolonged participation in NOA markets. 
c. Loui Consulting Group INC. 
The Loui Consulting Group INC. is classified as a provider of computer 
related services and marketing consulting services (Hoover's Company Records - In-
depth Records, 2013).  The reported net sales of Loui Consulting are $2M for FY12 and 
Loui Consulting has 16 employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
Loui Consulting’s total FY 12 Contracts for the NOA market $6.5M or 
greater was one award (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD 
agencies, independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Loui Consulting was 
awarded 17 contracts by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  Loui Consulting’s 
history with the DoD/DON dates back over a decade and the annual award total has 
ranged from $1.1M in 2000 to $10.5M in 2012 (United States Government, 2013).     
Loui Consulting is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that does not 
possess a great deal of intellectual property.  Loui Consulting has not submitted any 
patents in the United States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  Loui Consulting 
and has consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each 
year from diversified and prolonged participation in NOA markets.  
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d. VRC INC. 
VRC INC. is classified as a provider of management consulting services 
(Hoover's Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The reported net sales of VRC 
are $11.4M for FY12 and VRC has 49 employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 
2012).   
VRC’s total FY 12 Contracts for the NOA market $6.5M or greater was 
one award (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, 
independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, VRC was awarded 144 contracts by 
the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  VRC’s history with the DoD/DON dates 
back to 2004 and the annual award totals have ranged from $37.6K in 2004 to $94M in 
2012 (United States Government, 2013).  
VRC is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that possesses a great 
deal of past intellectual property.  VRC has submitted 46 total patents in the United States 
in VRC’s history; however, VRC has not submitted any patents in the US over the past 
24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  VRC and has consistently benefitted as evidenced by 
increasing DoD/DON award totals each year from diversified and prolonged participation 
in NOA markets.    
3. Analysis 
a. Design Disclosure Barrier 
The SBC prime NOA market where each individual contract was for 
$6.5M or greater suggests that there is a design disclosure barrier that prevents companies 
that possess intellectual property from participation in this category of the NOA market.  
Unlike the large prime in this category of the NOA market the SBCs that participate have 
no reliance on intellectual property.  The absence of patents submitted by the SBC in this 
category is evidence that design disclosure barriers exist and limit competition.  The stark 
contrast from the large prime one hundred percent patent submission in this category vs. 
the zero percent SBC submission in this category supports the claim that would be SBC 
participants that possess intellectual property prefer to not participate in this category of 
NOA markets. 
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b. Risk Mitigation Barrier 
The seventy-five percent of the SBCs awarded contracts in this category 
have established relationships with the DoD/DON that have been occurring for a decade 
and in some cases occurring for decades.  This ongoing relationship suggests that there is 
evidence of the DON being risk adverse and consistently awarding contracts to a limited 
number of recurring SBC primes in this category of the NOA market.  The DON awarded 
one hundred percent of the total number of awards and one hundred percent of the total 
dollar award to the top four SBC primes. 
The risk mitigation barrier is exposed on two levels in this category of the 
NOA market.  The first is that the SBC only is awarded three percent of the eligible 
monetary award and six percent of the total number of awards in this category of the 
NOA market.  The second is that there are only four SBC companies awarded contracts 
in this category of the NOA market.  This category of the NOA market is clearly biased 
(ninety-seven percent of the award) and the DON consistently awards the majority of the 
contracts in this category of the NOA market to large primes and the remaining few 
contracts are consistently awarded to the same top SBCs in this category of the NOA 
market.   
c. Prime Practices Barrier 
There is striking evidence in this category of prime practices that prevent 
competition.  The top top four SBC primes in this category of the NOA market each 
experienced increasing award totals over the duration of their participation with the 
DoD/DON.  This behavior indicates that there is a propensity for SBC primes to 
consistently seek more contract awards and to be awarded at an increasing rate as the in 
this category of the NOA market.  The prime practice barrier is best demonstrated by 
VRC INC., increase in contract revenue from $37.6K in 2004 to $94M in 2012 (United 
States Government, 2013).     
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F. ADP CONTRACTS $6.5M OR HIGHER LARGE PRIME 
CONTRACTORS 
1. Market Summary 
The DON spent a total of $54M on contracts for the ADP market (PSC 7030) 
where each individual contract was for $6.5M or greater (United States Government, 
2013).  Contracts in excess of $6.5M awarded to large prime contractors in the ADP 
market accounted for all the awards in this category.  After reviewing the data it is noted 
that large primes accounted for $54M of this award or one hundred percent of the total 
award.  Large primes were awarded six contracts in excess of $6.5M for FY12 (United 
States Government, 2013).  Of the six contracts awarded by the DON to large primes in 
this category six of the contracts were awarded to the top four large primes (United States 
Government, 2013).  The top four large prime contractors were awarded one hundred 
percent of the total number of awarded contracts by the DON in this category.  
 
 Large Prime Contracts Greater Than $6.5M vs. Total Award ADP Market Figure 9. 
$54,058,567 $54,058,567 $54,058,567
Award
FY 12 Large Prime Contracts Greater Than 
$6.5M vs Total ADP Market
Total Total Large Prime Top 4 Large Prime
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The top four large primes account for $54M of the total large prime award for this 
category and this constitutes one hundred percent of the eligible monetary award went to 
the top four companies.  The data collected in this section produce results that suggest 
that contracts in the ADP market over $6.5M are consistently awarded to a select few 
large primes.  Figure 10 represents the top four awardees as a percentage of the total ADP 
award that went to large primes in this category  
 
 Top 4 Large Primes Awarded FY12 as a Percentage of Total Large Award Figure 10. 
$6.5M or Greater ADP Market 
2. Profiles 
The top four companies in this category along with the total dollar amount 
awarded to each company for FY12 are provided in Table 7.  The following section is a 
brief profile of each company considered to be a top performer for this specific category.  
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behaviors and business characteristics that are shared by the top performers for this 
category. 
 
Table 7.   Top 4 Large Primes Awarded $6.5M or Greater ADP Market Amount 
Awarded 
a. Softchoice Corporation 
The Softchoice Corporation is classified as a provider of computer 
peripherals, software and computer integrated systems design (Hoover's Company 
Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The reported net sales of Softchoice are $999.4M for 
FY12 and Softchoice has 1,112 employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
Softchoice’s total FY 12 Contracts for the ADP Market $6.5M or greater 
was three awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD 
agencies, independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Softchoice was awarded 356 
contracts by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  Softchoice’s history with the 
DoD/DON dates back a decade and the annual award total has ranged from $544K in 
2002 to $71.1M in 2012 (United States Government, 2013).     
Softchoice is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that does not 
possess a great deal of intellectual property.  Softchoice has not submitted any patents in 
the United States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  Softchoice and has 
consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year 
from diversified and prolonged participation in ADP markets.    
b. Intersystems Corporation 
The Intersystem Corporation is classified as a provider of computer 




The Boeing Company $7,900,000
DLT Solutions LLC $7,647,721
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Records, 2013).  The reported net sales of Intersystems are $385M for FY12 and 
Intersystems has 500 employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
Intersystems’ total FY 12 Contracts for the ADP market $6.5M or greater 
was one award (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, 
independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Intersystems was awarded 5 contracts 
by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  Intersystems’ history with the DoD/DON 
dates back over a decade and the annual award total has ranged from $2.7M in 2000 to 
$9.2M in 2012 (United States Government, 2013).     
Intersystems is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that possesses 
limited intellectual property.  Intersystems has submitted one patent in the United States 
in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  Intersystems and has consistently benefitted as 
evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year from diversified and 
prolonged participation in ADP markets.    
c. The Boeing Company 
The Boeing Company is classified as a provider of aircraft, navigation and 
search equipment (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The reported 
net sales of Boeing are $68.7B for FY12 and Boeing has 171,700 employees (Global 
Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
Boeing’s total FY 12 Contracts for the ADP Market $6.5M or greater was 
one award (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, 
independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Boeing was awarded 10,350 contracts 
by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  Boeing’s history with the DoD/DON 
dates back over a decade and the annual award total has been in the billions of dollars 
(United States Government, 2013).     
Boeing is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that possesses a great 
deal of intellectual property.  Boeing has submitted 271 patents in the United States in the 
past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  Boeing and has consistently benefitted as evidenced 
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by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year from diversified and prolonged 
participation in ADP markets.    
d. DLT Solutions LLC 
DLT Solutions is classified as a provider of computer programming 
services and computer integrated system design (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth 
Records, 2013).  The reported net sales of DLT Solutions are $150K for FY12 and DLT 
Solutions has 250 employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
DLT’s total FY 12 Contracts for the ADP Market $6.5M or greater was 
one award (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, 
independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, DLT was awarded 1,134 contracts by 
the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  DLT’s history with the DoD/DON dates 
back over a decade and the annual award total has ranged from $12.4M in 2000 to 
$132M in 2012 (United States Government, 2013).     
DLT is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that does not possess a 
great deal of intellectual property.  DLT has not submitted any patents in the United 
States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  DLT and has consistently benefitted as 
evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year from diversified and 
prolonged participation in ADP markets.    
3. Analysis 
a. Design Disclosure Barrier  
Analysis of the top four large primes in this category of the ADP market 
suggests that there is no link between the number of patents submitted in the past two 
years and a design disclosure barrier.  Intersystems Corporation and The Boeing 
Company each submitted patents in the past two years; on the other hand the Softchoice 
Corporation and DLT Solutions LLC., submitted zero patents the past two years.  This 
50/50 split suggests that there are not design disclosure barriers that prevent competition 
in this category of the ADP market. 
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b. Risk Mitigation Barrier 
Each of the four large primes profiled in this category have established 
relationships with the DoD/DON that have been occurring for a decade and in some cases 
occurring for decades.  This ongoing relationship suggests that there is evidence of the 
DON being risk adverse and consistently awarding contracts to a limited number of 
recurring large primes.  The DON awarded one hundred percent of the total number of 
awards and one hundred percent of the total dollar award to the top four large primes.  
The DON’s risk mitigation barrier is made evident by the employment of only four large 
primes, each possessing over a decade of experience in DoD/DON participation  
c. Prime Practices Barrier 
There is evidence in this category of prime practice barriers that prevent 
competition.  The top four large primes in this category each experienced increasing 
award totals over the past decade.  This behavior indicates that there is a propensity for 
large primes to consistently seek more contract awards and to be awarded at an increasing 
rate as the familiarity to DoD/DON business practices increases.  This behavior is also 
influenced by the risk mitigation barrier.  As large primes are deemed less risk adverse to 
the DoD/DON there appears to be a link to increased awards.  Evidence of a price 
practice barrier allows the familiar large prime to capitalize on limited competition in this 
category of the ADP market. 
G. ADP CONTRACTS $6.5M OR HIGHER SBC PRIME CONTRACTORS 
1. Market Summary 
The DON spent $54M on contracts for the ADP Market (PSC 7030) where each 
individual contract was for $6.5M or greater (United States Government, 2013).  
Contracts in excess of $6.5M awarded to SBC prime contractors in the ADP market 
accounted for none of the all the awards in this category.  After reviewing the data it is 
noted that SBC primes did not account for any of these.  Large primes were awarded six 
contracts in excess of $6.5M for FY12 (United States Government, 2013).   
 70
 
 SBC Prime Award Greater Than $6.5M vs. Total Award ADP Market  Figure 11. 
SBC primes account for $0 of the total award for this category and this constitutes 
zero percent of the eligible monetary award went to SBCs.  The data collected in this 
section produce results that suggest that the ADP market in excess of $6.5M per contract 
is consistently awarded to a select few large primes.   
2. Analysis 
a. Risk Mitigation Barrier 
There were no SBC awards in this category of the ADP market.  The 
consistent award of contracts in this category of the ADP market to exclusively large 
primes is indicative of the DON’s risk mitigation barrier.  This category of the ADP 
Market is biased to only large primes, and as a result, the SBC is eliminated for 




FY 12 SBC Prime Award Greater Than 
$6.5M vs. Total ADP Market
Total Total SBC Award Top SBC Prime
 71
H. DON CONTRACTS $1–$6.49M LARGE PRIME CONTRACTORS 
1. Market Summary 
The DON spent a total of $35.3B on contracts for the DON market (all PSCs) 
where each individual contract ranged from $1–$6.49M (United States Government, 
2013).  Large prime contractors in the DON market accounted for a majority of the all the 
awards in this category.  After reviewing the data it is noted that large primes accounted 
for $26.5B of this award or seventy-five percent of the total award.  Large primes were 
awarded 191,537 contracts ranging from $1–$6.49M is this category for FY12 (United 
States Government, 2013).  Of the 191,573 contracts awarded by the DON to large 
primes in this category, 7,360 of the contracts were awarded to the top five large primes 
(United States Government, 2013).  The top five large prime contractors were awarded 
four percent of the total number of awarded contracts by the DON in this category.  
 
 





FY 12 Large Prime Contracts $1–$6.49M 
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The top five large primes account for $5.9B of the total large prime award for this 
category and this constitutes nineteen percent of the eligible monetary award went to the 
top five companies.  The data collected in this section produce results that suggest that 
the majority dollars spent by DON in this category is consistently awarded to large 
primes and a select few large primes are awarded the most lucrative contracts.  Figure 13 
represents the top five awardees as a percentage of the total DON award that went to 
large primes in this category.   
  
 
 Top 5 Large Primes Awarded FY12 as a Percentage of Total Large Award Figure 13. 
$1–6.49M DON Market 
2. Profiles 
The top five companies in this category along with the total dollar amount 
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brief profile of each company considered to be a top performer for this specific category.  
The purpose of this section is to highlight certain data in order to establish typical 




Table 8.   Top 5 Large Primes Awarded $1–$6.49M DON Market Amount Awarded 
a. General Dynamics Corporation 
The General Dynamics Corporation is classified as a provider of ship 
building, repair and aircraft (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The 
reported net sales of General Dynamics are $32.7B for FY12 and General Dynamics has 
95,100 employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
General Dynamics’ total FY 12 Contracts for the DON market $1–6.49M 
was 3,576 awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD 
agencies, independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, General Dynamics was 
awarded 8,961 contracts by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  General 
Dynamics’ history with the DoD/DON dates back over a decade and the annual award 
total is consistently over a billion dollars (United States Government, 2013).     
General Dynamics is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that 
possesses limited intellectual property.  General Dynamics has submitted nine patents in 
the United States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  General Dynamics and has 
consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year 
from diversified and prolonged participation in DON markets.    
Company Amount Awarded
General Dynamics Corporation $1,641,893,578
Lockheed Martin Corporation $1,182,958,949




b. Lockheed Martin Corporation 
The Lockheed Martin Corporation is classified as a provider of aircraft, 
aircraft parts and equipment (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The 
reported net sales of Lockheed Martin are $46.5B for FY12 and Lockheed has 123,000 
employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
Lockheed’s total FY 12 Contracts for the DON market $1 - 6.49M was 
2,017 awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, 
independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Lockheed was awarded 13,454 
contracts by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  Lockheed’s history with the 
DoD/DON dates back over a decade and the annual award total consistently has been in 
the billions of dollars (United States Government, 2013).     
Lockheed is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that possesses a 
great deal of intellectual property.  Lockheed has submitted 101 patents in the United 
States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  Lockheed and has consistently 
benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year from diversified 
and prolonged participation in DON markets.    
c. BAE Systems PLC 
BAE Systems PLC is classified as a provider of aircraft (Hoover's 
Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The reported net sales of BAE Systems 
PLC are $17.8B for FY12 and BAE Systems PLC has 87,000 employees (Global Duns 
Market Identifiers, 2012).   
BAE Systems PLC total FY 12 Contracts for the DON market $1 - 6.49M 
was 2,649 awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD 
agencies, independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, BAE Systems PLC was 
awarded 2,649 contracts by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  BAE Systems 
PLC history with the DoD/DON dates back to 2004 and the annual award has ranged 
from $8.4M in 2004 to $4.1M in 2012 (United States Government, 2013).     
 75
BAE Systems PLC is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that 
possesses limited intellectual property.  BAE Systems PLC has submitted nine patents in 
the United States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  BAE Systems PLC and has 
consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year 
from diversified and prolonged participation in DON markets.  
d. SAIC INC. 
SAIC INC. is classified as a provider of computer integrated system 
design, computer programming services, pre-packaged software and computer related 
services (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The reported net sales 
of SAIC are $10.6B for FY12 and SAIC has 41,100 employees (Global Duns Market 
Identifiers, 2012).   
SAIC’s total FY 12 Contracts for the DON market $1 - 6.49M was 2,383 
awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, 
independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, SAIC was awarded 6,425 contracts by 
the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  SAIC’s history with the DoD/DON dates 
back over a decade and the annual award total has ranged from $281.6M in 2000 to 
$3.4B in 2012 (United States Government, 2013).     
SAIC is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that possesses limited 
intellectual property.  SAIC has submitted three patents in the United States in the past 24 
months (LexisNexis, 2013).  SAIC and has consistently benefited as evidenced by 
increasing DoD/DON award totals each year from diversified and prolonged participation 
in DON markets.    
e. Raytheon Company 
The Raytheon Company is classified as a provider of navigation, search 
equipment and communication equipment (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth 
Records, 2013).  The reported net sales of Raytheon are $24.8B for FY12 and Raytheon 
has 71,000 employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
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Raytheon’s total FY 12 Contracts for the DON market $1 - 6.49M was 
1,265 awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, 
independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Raytheon was awarded 9,475 contracts 
by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  Raytheon’s history with the DoD/DON 
dates back over a decade and the annual award has consistently been for billions of 
dollars (United States Government, 2013).     
Raytheon is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that possesses a 
great deal of intellectual property.  Raytheon has submitted 143 patents in the United 
States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  Raytheon and has consistently 
benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year from diversified 
and prolonged participation in DON markets.    
3. Analysis 
a. Design Disclosure Barrier  
The large prime DON market where each individual contract was for 
$1–6.49M greater, suggests that there is no design disclosure barrier experienced by the 
top five large primes in this category of the DON market.  Each of the top five companies 
submitted multiple patents and have possessed various amounts of intellectual property 
the past two years.  What must be understood by potential competitors in this category of 
the DON market is that in order to be viable, a top five large prime in this category must 
possess some intellectual property.   
b. Risk Mitigation Barrier 
Analysis of the risk mitigation barrier for this category of the DON market 
reveals a DoD/DON tendency to employ familiar top large primes.  Four of the top five 
large primes profiled in this category have established relationships with the DoD/DON 
that have been occurring for a decade and in some cases occurring for decades.  This 
ongoing relationship with eighty percent of the participants suggests that there is 
evidence of the DON attempting to mitigate risk by consistently awarding contracts to a 
limited number of recurring top large primes.  However, this practice is offset by the data 
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that demonstrates that the DON awarded only four percent of the total number of awards 
and nineteen percent of the total dollar award to the top five large primes.  Conversely, all 
other large primes were awarded ninety-six percent of the total number of awards and 
eighty-one percent of the total dollar award.  The DON’s risk-adverse practices are 
evident in this category but are lessened by an obviously competitive large prime award 
process.  
c. Prime Practices Barrier 
There is evidence in this category of prime practices that limit 
competition.  The top four of five large primes in this category each experienced 
increasing award totals over the past decade.  This behavior indicates that there is a 
propensity for large primes to consistently seek more contract awards and to be awarded 
at an increasing rate as the familiarity to DoD/DON business practices increases.  Prime 
practice barriers in this category of the DON market allow the large prime to capitalize 
on recurring relationships and access to intellectual property through design disclosure.     
I. DON CONTRACTS $1.00-6.49M SBC PRIME CONTRACTS 
1. Market Summary  
The DON spent a total of $35.3B on contracts for the DON market (all PSCs) 
where each individual contract ranged from $1–6.49M (United States Government, 
2013).  Contracts ranging from $1–6.49M awarded to SBC prime contractors in the DON 
market accounted for a notable percentage of the all the awards in this category.  After 
reviewing the data it is noted that SBC primes accounted for $8.8B of this award or 
twenty-five percent of the total award.  SBC primes were awarded 58,215 contracts 
ranging $1–6.49M in this category for FY12 (United States Government, 2013).  Of the 
58,215 contracts awarded by the DON to SBC primes in this category 1,854 of the 
contracts were awarded to the top five SBC primes (United States Government, 2013).  
The top five SBC prime contractors were awarded five percent of the total number of 
awarded contracts by the DON in this category.  
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 SBC Prime Contract $1–6.49M vs. Total DON Market Figure 14. 
The top five large primes account for $425M of the total large prime award for 
this category and this constitutes five percent of the eligible monetary award went to the 
top five companies.  The data collected in this section produce results that suggest that 
the $1–6.49M DON market is diversely distributed among many different SBC primes.  
Figure 15 represents the top five awardees as a percentage of the total DON award that 
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 Top 5 SBC Primes Awarded FY12 as a Percentage of Total SBC Award $1–Figure 15. 
6.49M DON Market 
2. Profiles 
The top five companies in this category along with the total dollar amount 
awarded to each company for FY12 are provided in Table 9.  The following section is a 
brief profile of each company considered to be a top performer for this specific category.  
The purpose of this section is to highlight certain data in order to establish typical 
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Table 9.   Top 5 SBC Primes Awarded $1–$6.49M DON Market Amount Awarded 
a. Afognak Native Corporation 
Afognak Native Corporation (ALUTIIQ) is classified as a provider of 
forestry services (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The reported 
net sales of Afognak are $1.8M for FY12 and Afognak has 4,450 employees (Global 
Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
Afognak’s total FY 12 Contracts for the $1–$6.49M DON market was 701 
awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, 
independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Afognak was awarded 2,138 contracts 
by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  Afognak’s history with the DoD/DON 
dates back over a decade and the annual award total has ranged from $844.8K in 2000 to 
$319.8M in 2012 (United States Government, 2013).     
Afognak’s is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that possesses 
limited intellectual property.  Afognak has submitted one patent in the United States in 
the past 24 months and nine patents total (LexisNexis, 2013).  Afognak and has 
consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year 
from diversified and prolonged participation in DON markets.    
b. Chugach Alaska Corporation 
The Chugach Alaska Corporation is classified as a provider of facilities 
support services and computer integrated systems design (Hoover's Company Records - 
In-depth Records, 2013).  The reported net sales of Chugach Alaska are $937M for FY12 
and Chugach Alaska has 5,400 employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
Company Amount Awarded
Afognak Native Corporation $126,633,571
Chugach Alaska Corporation $84,548,256
Gryphon Technologies LC $80,303,158
Delphinus Engineering Corporation $71,137,568
Manu Kai LLC $62,327,174
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Chugach Alaska’s total FY 12 Contracts for the $1–$6.49M DON market 
was 490 awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD 
agencies, independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Chugach Alaska was 
awarded 1,395 contracts by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  Chugach 
Alaska’s history with the DoD/DON dates back over a decade and the annual award total 
has ranged from $173.8M in 2000 to $321M in 2012 (United States Government, 2013).     
Chugach Alaska is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that does not 
possess a great deal of intellectual property.  Chugach Alaska has not submitted any 
patents in the United States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  Chugach Alaska 
and has consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each 
year from diversified and prolonged participation in DON markets.    
c. Gryphon Technologies LC 
Gryphon Technologies LC is classified as a provider of commercial 
physical research and computer programing services (Hoover's Company Records - In-
depth Records, 2013).  The reported net sales of Gryphon Technologies are $87.8M for 
FY12 and Gryphon Technologies has 250 employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 
2012). 
Gryphon Technologies’ total FY 12 Contracts for the $1–$6.49M DON 
market was 168 awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD 
agencies, independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Gryphon Technologies was 
awarded 201 contracts by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  Gryphon 
Technologies’ history with the DoD/DON dates back over a decade and the annual award 
total has ranged from $3.7M in 2000 to $82.4M in 2012 (United States Government, 
2013).  
Gryphon Technologies is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that 
does not possess a great deal of intellectual property.  Gryphon Technologies has not 
submitted any patents in the United States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  
Gryphon Technologies and has consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing 
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DoD/DON award totals each year from diversified and prolonged participation in DON 
markets.  
d. Delphinus Engineering Corporation 
The Delphinus Engineering Corporation is classified as a provider of 
engineering services and repair services (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth Records, 
2013).  The reported net sales of Delphinus Engineering are $33M for FY12 and 
Delphinus Engineering has 370 employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
Delphinus Engineering’s total FY 12 Contracts for the DON market  
$1–$6.49M was 319 awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and 
DoD agencies, independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Delphinus Engineering 
was awarded 319 contracts by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  Delphinus 
Engineering’s history with the DoD/DON dates back to 2005 and the annual award total 
has ranged from $510.5K in 2005 to $11.6M in 2012 (United States Government, 2013).     
Delphinus Engineering is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that 
does not possess a great deal of intellectual property.  Delphinus has not submitted any 
patents in the United States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  Delphinus 
Engineering and has consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award 
totals each year from diversified and prolonged participation in DON markets.    
e. Manu Kai LLC  
Manu Kai LLC is classified as a provider of computer facilities 
management (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The reported net 
sales of Manu Kai are $5.1M for FY12 and Manu Kai has 99 employees (Global Duns 
Market Identifiers, 2012).   
Manu Kai’s total FY 12 Contracts for the DON market $1–$6.49M was 
176 awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, 
independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Manu Kai was awarded 258 contracts 
by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  Manu Kai’s history with the DoD/DON 
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dates back to 2009 and annual award total has ranged from $52.1M in 2009 to $65.5M in 
2012 (United States Government, 2013).     
Manu Kai is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that does not 
possess a great deal of intellectual property.  Manu Kai has not submitted any patents in 
the United States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  Manu Kai and has 
consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year 
from diversified and prolonged participation in DON markets.    
3. Analysis 
a. Design Disclosure Barrier 
The top five in the SBC prime DON market where each individual 
contract was for $1–$6.49M collectively possesses very little intellectual property.  Only 
one of five companies, Afognak Native Corporation has submitted one patent in the past 
two years and a total of nine patents overall.  The majority of the top SBC participants in 
this category of the DON market do not possess intellectual property.  When compared to 
the large primes in a similar category of the DON market, where one hundred percent of 
the top five possessed intellectual property the absence of intellectual property for the 
SBC primes suggests that there is a design disclosure barrier associated with SBC 
participation in this category of the DON market.   
b. Risk Mitigation Barrier 
Three of the five SBCs primes profiled in this category have established 
relationships with the DoD/DON that have been occurring for a decade and in some cases 
occurring for decades.  Evidence that forty percent of the top SBCs in this category of the 
DON market have yet to establish relationships of a decade or more indicate that the risk 
mitigation barrier in this category of the DON market is limited when applied to SBC 
participation.  The recurring SBCs in this category were only awarded five percent of the 
number of awards and five percent of the total dollar award.  Conversely, all other SBC 
primes were awarded ninety-five percent of the total number of awards and ninety-five 
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percent of the total dollar award.  This category of the DON market is an obvious 
example of a competitive award process.  
c. Prime Practices Barrier 
Although minimal there is evidence in this category of prime practices that 
may limit competition.  The top five SBC primes in this category each experienced 
increasing award totals over the past decade.  This behavior indicates that there is a 
propensity for SBC primes to consistently seek more contract awards and to be awarded 
at an increasing rate as the familiarity to DoD/DON business practices increases.  This 
behavior indicates that the top SBC prime is able to capitalize on limited competition, 
through typical prime practices.   
J. NOA CONTRACTS $1.00-6.49M LARGE PRIME CONTRACTORS 
1. Market Summary 
The DON spent a total of $2.46B on contracts for the NOA market 
(PSCs 70 & D) where each individual contract was for $1–$6.49M (United States 
Government, 2013).  Contracts ranging from $1–$6.49M awarded to large prime 
contractors in the NOA market accounted for a majority of the all the awards in this 
category.  After reviewing the data it is noted that large primes accounted for $1.82B of 
this award or seventy-four percent of the total award.  Large primes were awarded 16,746 
contracts ranging from $1–$6.49M in the NOA market for FY12 (United States 
Government, 2013).  Of the 16,746 contracts awarded by the DON to large primes in this 
category, 1,007 of the contracts were awarded to the top five large primes (United States 
Government, 2013).  The top five large prime contractors were awarded sixty-eight 
percent of the total number of awarded contracts by the DON in this category.  
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 Large Prime Contracts $1–$6.49M vs. Total Award NOA Market Figure 16. 
The top five large primes account for $510M of the total large prime award for 
this category and this constitutes twenty-eight percent of the eligible monetary award 
went to the top five companies.  The data collected in this section produce results that 
suggest that the majority of the DON market is consistently awarded to a select few large 
primes.  Figure 17 represents the top five awardees as a percentage of the total NOA 
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 Top 5 Large Primes Awarded FY12 as a Percentage of Total Large Award Figure 17. 
$1–6.49M NOA Market 
2. Profiles 
The top five companies in this category along with the total dollar amount 
awarded to each company for FY12 are provided in Table 10.  The following section is a 
brief profile of each company considered to be a top performer for this specific category.  
The purpose of this section is to highlight certain data in order to establish typical 
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Table 10.   Top 5 Large Primes Awarded $1–$6.49M NOA Market Amount Awarded 
a. Hewlett-Packard Company 
The Hewlett-Packard Company is classified as a provider of electronic 
computers, computer storage devices, computer peripheral equipment, investment advice, 
computer programming services, pre-packaged software, computer integrated systems 
design, data processing and preparation and computer related services (Hoover's 
Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The reported net sales of Hewlett-Packard 
are $120.3B for FY12 and Hewlett-Packard has 324,600 employees (Global Duns Market 
Identifiers, 2012).   
Hewlett-Packard’s total FY 12 Contracts for the NOA market $1–$6.49M 
was 319 awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD 
agencies, independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Hewlett-Packard was 
awarded 2,379 contracts by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  Hewlett-
Packard’s history with the DoD/DON dates back over a decade and the annual award 
total has ranged from $14.7M in 2000 to $138.3M in 2012 (United States Government, 
2013).     
Hewlett-Packard is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that 
possesses a great deal of intellectual property.  Hewlett-Packard has submitted 288 
patents in the United States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  Hewlett-Packard 
and has consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each 




General Dynamics Corporation $99,177,511
Lockheed Martin Corporation $92,316,228
Caci International INC. $80,431,140
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b. SAIC INC. 
SAIC INC. is classified as a provider of computer integrated system 
design, computer programming services, pre-packaged software and computer related 
services (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The reported net sales 
of SAIC are $10.6B for FY12 and SAIC has 41,100 employees (Global Duns Market 
Identifiers, 2012).   
SAIC’s total FY 12 Contracts for the NOA market $1–$6.49M was 141 
awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, 
independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, SAIC was awarded 6,425 contracts by 
the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  SAIC’s history with the DoD/DON dates 
back over a decade and the annual award total has ranged from $281.6M in 2000 to 
$3.4B in 2012 (United States Government, 2013).     
SAIC is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that possesses limited 
intellectual property.  SAIC has submitted three patents in the United States in the past 24 
months (LexisNexis, 2013).  SAIC and has consistently benefitted as evidenced by 
increasing DoD/DON award totals each year from diversified and prolonged participation 
in NOA markets.    
c. General Dynamics Corporation 
The General Dynamics Corporation is classified as a provider of ship 
building, repair and aircraft (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The 
reported net sales of General Dynamics are $32.7B for FY12 and General Dynamics has 
95,100 employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
General Dynamics’ total FY 12 Contracts for the NOA market $1–$6.49M 
was 204 awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD 
agencies, independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, General Dynamics was 
awarded 8,961 contracts by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  General 
Dynamics’ history with the DoD/DON dates back over a decade and the annual award 
total is consistently over a billion dollars (United States Government, 2013).     
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General Dynamics is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that 
possesses limited intellectual property.  General Dynamics has submitted nine patents in 
the United States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  General Dynamics and has 
consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year 
from diversified and prolonged participation in NOA markets.    
d. Lockheed Martin Corporation 
The Lockheed Martin Corporation is classified as a provider of aircraft, 
aircraft parts and equipment (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The 
reported net sales of Lockheed Martin are $46.5B for FY12 and Lockheed has 123,000 
employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
Lockheed’s total FY 12 Contracts for the NOA market $1–$6.49M was 
221 awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, 
independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Lockheed was awarded 13,454 
contracts by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  Lockheed’s history with the 
DoD/DON dates back over a decade and the annual award total consistently has been in 
the billions of dollars (United States Government, 2013).     
Lockheed is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that possesses a 
great deal of intellectual property.  Lockheed has submitted 101 patents in the United 
States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  Lockheed and has consistently 
benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year from diversified 
and prolonged participation in NOA markets.    
e. Caci International INC. 
Caci International INC. is classified as a provider of computer integrated 
system design, computer programming services, pre-packaged software and computer 
facilities management (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The 
reported net sales of Caci International are $3.77B for FY12 and Caci International has 
14,500 employees (United States Government, 2013).   
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Caci International’s total FY 12 Contracts for the NOA market $1–
$6.49M was 122 awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD 
agencies, independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Caci International was 
awarded 3,096 contracts by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  Caci 
International’s history with the DoD/DON dates back more than a decade and the annual 
award total has ranged from $43.3M in 2000 to $555.3M in 2012 (United States 
Government, 2013).   
Caci International is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that 
possesses very limited intellectual property.  Caci International has not submitted any 
patents in the United States in the past 24 months and two patents total (LexisNexis, 
2013).  Caci International and has consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing 
DoD/DON award totals each year from diversified and prolonged participation in NOA 
markets.    
3. Analysis 
a. Design Disclosure Barrier 
Analysis of the large prime NOA market where each individual contract 
was for $1–6.49M greater suggests that there is a link between the number of patents 
submitted in the past two years and the cumulative dollar amount of contracts awarded to 
each company in this category of the NOA market.  Four of the five top large primes in 
this category of the NOA market possess intellectual property and have submitted patents 
in the past two years.  The only large prime that has not submitted patents in the past two 
years was Caci International INC., who ranked five of five in the cumulative dollar 
amount awarded to the top five large primes.  The top awardee, Hewlett-Packard led all 
with 288 patents submitted.   
When it is considered that eighty percent of the large primes awarded in 
this category are companies that have submitted patents in the US the past two years; 
there is no evidence to suggest that large primes are negatively impacted by design 
disclosure barriers that require disclosure of intellectual property to the DON.   
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b. Risk Mitigation Barrier 
Each of the five large primes profiled in this category have established 
relationships with the DoD/DON that have been occurring for a decade and in some cases 
occurring for decades.  This ongoing relationship suggests that there is evidence of the 
DON being risk adverse and consistently awarding contracts to a limited number of 
recurring large primes.  The DON awarded sixty-eight percent of the total number of 
awards and twenty-eight percent of the total dollar award to the top five large primes.  
Conversely, all other large primes were awarded thirty-two percent of the total number of 
awards and seventy-two percent of the total dollar award.  The DON’s risk adverse 
practices that lead to competition barriers are evident in the significant number of 
contracts awarded to a recurring top five large prime. 
c. Prime Practices Barrier 
There is evidence in this category of prime practices that prevent 
competition.  The top five large primes in this category each experienced increasing 
award totals over the past decade.  This behavior indicates that there is a propensity for 
large primes to consistently seek more contract awards and to be awarded at an increasing 
rate as the familiarity to DoD/DON business practices increases.  This behavior is also 
influenced the risk mitigation barrier, as large primes are deemed less risk adverse to the 
DoD/DON there appears to be a link to increased awards.  Through prime practice 
barriers the large prime is able to capitalize on limited competition opportunities.   
K. NOA CONTRACTS $1–6.49M SBC PRIME CONTRACTORS 
1. Market Summary  
The DON spent a total of $2.46B on contracts for the NOA market (PSCs 70 & 
D) where each individual contract was for $1–$6.49M (United States Government, 2013).  
Contracts ranging from $1–6.49M awarded to SBC Prime Contractors in the NOA 
market account for a significant portion of the all the awards in this category.  After 
reviewing the data it is noted that SBC Primes accounted for $635M of this award or 
twenty-six percent of the total award.  SBC Primes were awarded 5,277 contracts ranging 
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from $1–$6.49M in the NOA market for FY12 (United States Government, 2013).  Of 
the 5,277 contracts awarded by the DON to SBC primes in this category 351 of the 
contracts were awarded to the top five SBC primes (United States Government, 2013).  
The top five SBC prime contractors were awarded seven percent of the total number of 
awarded contracts by the DON in this category.  
 
 
 SBC Prime Contracts $1–$6.49M vs. Total NOA Market Figure 18. 
The top five SBC primes account for $78.3M of the total SBC prime award for 
this category and this constitutes twelve percent of the eligible monetary award went to 
the top five companies.  The data collected in this section produce results that suggest 
that the NOA SBC market is substantial and diverse.  Figure 19 represents the top five 
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 Top 5 SBC Primes Awarded FY12 as a Percentage of Total Figure 19. 
 SBC Award $1–$6.49M NOA Market  
2. Profiles 
The top five companies in this category along with the total dollar amount 
awarded to each company for FY12 are provided in Table 11.  The following section is a 
brief profile of each company considered to be a top performer for this specific category.  
The purpose of this section is to highlight certain data in order to establish typical 
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Table 11.   Top 5 SBC Primes Awarded $1–$6.49M NOA Market Amount Awarded 
a. World Wide Technology Holding CO. INC. 
World Wide Technology Holding CO. INC. is classified as a provider of 
computer peripherals, software and business consulting (Hoover's Company Records - In-
depth Records, 2013).  The reported net sales of World Wide Technology are $4B for 
FY12 and World Wide Technology has 1,008 employees (Global Duns Market 
Identifiers, 2012).   
World Wide Technology’s total FY 12 Contracts for the NOA market $1–
$6.49M was 158 awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD 
agencies, independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, World Wide Technology was 
awarded 1,845 contracts by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  World Wide’s 
history with the DoD/DON dates back over a decade and the annual award total has 
ranged from $27.6M in 2000 to $239.6M in 2012 (United States Government, 2013).     
World Wide Technology is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that 
does not possess a great deal of intellectual property.  World Wide Technology has not 
submitted any patents in the United States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  
World Wide Technology and has consistently benefited as evidenced by increasing 
DoD/DON award totals each year from diversified and prolonged participation in NOA 
markets.    
b. Nana Regional Corporation INC. 
Nana Regional Corporation, INC. is classified as a provider of navigation, 
oil and gas field services, electrical services and combination utilities (Hoover's 
Company Amount Awarded
World Wide Technology Holding CO. INC. $21,502,934





Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The reported net sales of Nana Regional 
are $1.6B for FY12 and Nana Regional has 9,000 employees (Global Duns Market 
Identifiers, 2012).   
Nana Regional’s total FY 12 Contracts for the NOA market $1–$6.49M 
was 68 awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, 
independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Nana Regional was awarded 81 
contracts by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  Nana Regional’s history with 
the DoD/DON dates back over a decade and the annual award total has ranged from $1M 
in 2000 to $7.6M in 2012 (United States Government, 2013).     
Nana Regional is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that does not 
possess a great deal of intellectual property.  Nana Regional has not submitted any 
patents in the United States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  Nana Regional 
and has consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each 
year from diversified and prolonged participation in NOA markets.    
c. NCS Technologies INC. 
NCS Technologies INC. is classified as a provider of computer and 
software stores (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The reported net 
sales of NCS Technologies are $420K for FY12 and NCS Technologies has 6 employees 
(Global Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
NCS Technologies’ total FY 12 Contracts for the NOA market $1–
$6.49M was 69 awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD 
agencies, independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, NCS Technologies was 
awarded 492 contracts by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  NCS 
Technologies history with the DoD/DON dates back over a decade and the annual award 
total has ranged from $2.8M in 2000 to $48.9M in 2012 (United States Government, 
2013).     
NCS Technologies is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that 
possesses minimal intellectual property.  NCS Technologies has not submitted any 
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patents in the United States in the past 24 months and one patent total (LexisNexis, 
2013).  NCS Technologies and has consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing 
DoD/DON award totals each year from diversified and prolonged participation in NOA 
markets.    
d. Novonics Corporation 
The Novonics Corporation is classified as a provider of management 
consulting services and computer related services (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth 
Records, 2013).  The reported net sales of Novonics Corporation are $10.8M for FY12 
and Novonics has 120 employees (United States Government, 2013).   
Novonics’ total FY 12 Contracts for the NOA market $1–$6.49M was 47 
awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, 
independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Novonics was awarded 94 contracts by 
the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  Novonics’ history with the DoD/DON dates 
back over a decade and the annual award total has ranged from $585.9K in 2001 to 
$26.1M in 2012 (United States Government, 2013).     
Novonics is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that possesses 
minimal intellectual property.  Novonics has not submitted any patents in the United 
States in the past 24 months and one total patent (LexisNexis, 2013).  Novonics and has 
consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year 
from diversified and prolonged participation in NOA markets.    
e. Smartronix INC. 
Smartronix INC. is classified as a provider of computer programming 
services and computer integrated systems design (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth 
Records, 2013).  The reported net sales of Smartronix INC. are $30.6M for FY12 and 
Smartronix has 500 employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
Smartronix’s total FY 12 Contracts for the NOA market $1–$6.49M was 
nine awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, 
independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Smartronix was awarded 55 contracts 
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by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  Smartronix’s history with the DoD/DON 
dates back over a decade and the annual award total has ranged from $15.4M in 2000 to 
$35.5M in 2012 (United States Government, 2013).     
Smartronix is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that possesses 
minimal intellectual property.  Smartronix has not submitted any patents in the United 
States in the past 24 months and two patents total (LexisNexis, 2013).  Smartronix and 
has consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year 
from diversified and prolonged participation in NOA markets.    
3. Analysis 
a. Design Disclosure Barrier 
The SBC prime NOA market where each individual contract was for $1–
$6.49M suggests that there is a design disclosure barrier that prevents companies that 
possess intellectual property from participation in this category of the NOA market.  
Unlike the large primes in this category of the NOA market the SBCs that participate 
have no reliance on intellectual property.  The absence of patents submitted by the SBC 
in this category is evidence that design disclosure barriers exist and limit competition.  
The stark contrast from the large prime eighty percent patent submission in this category 
vs. the zero percent SBC submission in this category supports the claim that would be 
SBC participants that possess intellectual property prefer to not participate in this 
category of NOA markets.  
b. Risk Mitigation Barrier 
Four of the five SBCs primes profiled in this category have established 
relationships with the DoD/DON that have been occurring for a decade and in some cases 
occurring for decades.  Despite evidence that a risk mitigation barrier exists it is easily 
mitigated by the level of SBC competition in this category of the NOA market.  The 
recurring SBCs in this category were only awarded seven percent of the number of 
awards and twelve percent of the total dollar award.  Conversely, all other SBC primes 
were awarded ninety-three percent of the total number of awards and eighty-eight percent 
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of the total dollar award.  This category of the NOA market is an obvious example of a 
competitive award process.    
c. Prime Practices Barrier 
There is evidence in this category of prime practices that could limit 
competition.  The top five SBC primes in this category each experienced increasing 
award totals over the past decade.  This behavior indicates that there is a propensity for 
SBC primes to consistently seek more contract awards and to be awarded at an increasing 
rate as the familiarity to DoD/DON business practices increases.  However, as with the 
risk mitigation barrier the diversity in the total awards and amount limit the leverage 
created by the prime practice barrier in this category of the NOA market.  SBCs in this 
category of the NOA market have a far greater opportunity to displace top SBC primes 
that have benefited from an increasing annual award due to typical prime practices.    
L. ADP CONTRACTS $1–6.49M LARGE PRIME CONTRACTORS 
1. Market Summary  
The DON spent a total of $405M on contracts for the ADP market (PSC 7030) 
where each individual contract was for $1–$6.49M (United States Government, 2013).  
Contracts ranging from $1–$6.49M awarded to large prime contractors in the ADP 
market accounted for a majority of the all the awards in this category.  After reviewing 
the data it is noted that large primes accounted for $349M of this award or eighty-six 
percent of the total award.  Large primes were awarded 4,477 contracts ranging from $1–
$6.49M in the ADP market for FY12 (United States Government, 2013).  Of the 4,477 
contracts awarded by the DON to large primes in this category 992 of the contracts were 
awarded to the top five large primes (United States Government, 2013).  The top five 
large prime contractors were awarded twenty-two percent of the total number of awarded 




 Large Prime Contracts $1–$6.49M vs. Total ADP Market Figure 20. 
The top five large primes account for $129.5M of the total large prime award for 
this category and this constitutes thirty-seven percent of the eligible monetary award went 
to the top five companies.  The data collected in this section produce results that suggest 
that the majority of the DON market is consistently awarded to a select few large primes.  
Figure 21 represents the top five awardees as a percentage of the total DON award that 





FY 12 Large Prime Contracts $1–$6.49M 
vs. Total ADP Market
Total Total Large Prime Top 5 Large Prime
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 Top 5 Large Primes Awarded FY12 as a Percentage of Total Large Figure 21. 
Award $1–$6.49M ADP Market 
2. Profiles 
The top five companies in this category along with the total dollar amount 
awarded to each company for FY12 are provided in Table 12.  The following section is a 
brief profile of each company considered to be a top performer for this specific category.  
The purpose of this section is to highlight certain data in order to establish typical 
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Table 12.   Top 5 Large Prime Awarded $1–$6.49M ADP Market Amount Awarded 
a. Softchoice Corporation 
The Softchoice Corporation is classified as a provider of computer 
peripherals, software and computer integrated systems design (Hoover's Company 
Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The reported net sales of Softchoice are $999.4M for 
FY12 and Softchoice has 1,112 employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
Softchoice’s total FY 12 Contracts for the ADP market $1–$6.49M was 
211 awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, 
independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Softchoice was awarded 356 contracts 
by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  Softchoice’s history with the DoD/DON 
dates back a decade and the annual award total has ranged from $544K in 2002 to 
$71.1M in 2012 (United States Government, 2013).     
Softchoice is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that does not 
possess a great deal of intellectual property.  Softchoice has not submitted any patents in 
the United States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  Softchoice and has 
consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year 
from diversified and prolonged participation in ADP markets.    
b. The Boeing Company 
The Boeing Company is classified as a provider of aircraft, navigation and 
search equipment (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The reported 
net sales of Boeing are $68.7B for FY12 and Boeing has 171,700 employees (Global 
Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
Company Amount Awarded
Softchoice Corporation $31,780,614
The Boeing Company $29,631,420
Dlt Solutions LLC $25,346,845
Immixgroup INC. $22,561,356
Carahsoft Technology Corporation $20,229,383
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Boeing’s total FY 12 Contracts for the ADP market $1–$6.49M was 
 36 awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, 
independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Boeing was awarded 10,350 contracts 
by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  Boeing’s history with the DoD/DON 
dates back over a decade and the annual award total has been in the billions of dollars 
(United States Government, 2013).     
Boeing is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that possesses a great 
deal of intellectual property.  Boeing has submitted 271 patents in the United States in the 
past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  Boeing and has consistently benefitted as evidenced 
by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year from diversified and prolonged 
participation in ADP markets.    
c. DLT Solutions LLC 
DLT Solutions is classified as a provider of computer programming 
services and computer integrated system design (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth 
Records, 2013).  The reported net sales of DLT Solutions are $150K for FY12 and DLT 
Solutions has 250 employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
DLT’s total FY 12 Contracts for the ADP market $1–$6.49M was 197 
awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, 
independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, DLT was awarded 1,134 contracts by 
the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  DLT’s history with the DoD/DON dates 
back over a decade and the annual award total has ranged from $12.4M in 2000 to 
$132M in 2012 (United States Government, 2013).     
DLT is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that does not possess a 
great deal of intellectual property.  DLT has not submitted any patents in the United 
States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  DLT and has consistently benefitted as 
evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year from diversified and 
prolonged participation in ADP markets.    
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d. Immixgroup INC. 
Immixgroup, INC. is classified as a provider of computers, peripherals and 
software (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The reported net sales 
of Immixgroup are $563.5M for FY12 and Immixgroup has 149 employees (Global Duns 
Market Identifiers, 2012).   
Immixgroup’s total FY 12 Contracts for the ADP market $1–$6.49M was 
263 awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, 
independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Immixgroup was awarded 319 
contracts by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  Immixgroup’s history with the 
DoD/DON dates back to 2006 and the annual award total has ranged from $239.2K in 
2006 to $15.8M in 2012 (United States Government, 2013).     
Immixgroup is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that does not 
possess a great deal of intellectual property.  Immixgroup has not submitted any patents 
in the United States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  Immixgroup and has 
consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year 
from diversified and prolonged participation in ADP markets.    
e. Carahsoft Technology Corporation 
Carahsoft Technology Corporation is classified as a provider of computer 
and software stores (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The 
reported net sales of Carahsoft are $585.7M for FY12 and Carahsoft Technology has 150 
employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
Carahsoft’s total FY 12 Contracts for the ADP market $1–$6.49M was 
285 awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, 
independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Carahsoft was awarded 12 contracts by 
the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  Carahsoft’s history with the DoD/DON 
dates back over a decade and the annual award total has ranged from $36.3K in 2000 to 
$405.3K in 2012 (United States Government, 2013).     
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Carahsoft is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that does not 
possess a great deal of intellectual property.  Carahsoft has not submitted any patents in 
the United States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  Carahsoft and has 
consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year 
from diversified and prolonged participation in ADP markets.    
3. Analysis 
a. Design Disclosure Barrier 
Analysis of the large prime ADP market where each individual contract 
was for $1–$6.49M suggests that there is a design disclosure barrier that prevents 
potential ADP companies from participating for contracts in this category of the ADP 
market.  Only one of five of the top large primes in this category of the ADP market has 
submitted patents in the past two years.  This behavior indicates that the top participants 
in this category of the ADP market have no intellectual capital to risk upon award of a 
contract.  Based on this analysis there is evidence to suggest data design disclosure 
barriers decrease competition in this category of the ADP market.     
b. Risk Mitigation Barrier 
Four of the five large primes profiled in this category have established 
relationships with the DoD/DON that have been occurring for a decade and in some cases 
occurring for decades.  This ongoing relationship suggests that there is evidence of the 
DON being risk adverse and consistently awarding contracts to a limited number of 
recurring large primes.  The DON awarded twenty-two percent of the total number of 
awards and thirty-seven percent of the total dollar award to the top five large primes.  
Conversely, all other large primes were awarded seventy-eight percent of the total 
number of awards and sixty-three percent of the total dollar award.  The DON’s risk 
adverse practices are evident not only the recurrence in the use of the same prime 
contractors for over a decade but these practices are also made evident through the 
significant reliance on only a few large primes for this category.    
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c. Prime Practices Barrier 
There is evidence in this category of prime practices that limit 
competition.  The top five large primes in this category each experienced increasing 
award totals over the past decade.  This behavior indicates that there is a propensity for 
large primes to consistently seek more contract awards and to be awarded at an increasing 
rate as the familiarity to DoD/DON business practices increases.  This behavior allows 
the large prime to capitalize on limited competition, through typical prime practices.   
M. ADP CONTRACTS $1.00-6.49M SBC PRIME CONTRACTORS 
1. Market Summary 
The DON spent a total of $405M on contracts for the ADP market (PSC 7030) 
where each individual contract was for $1–$6.49M (United States Government, 2013).  
Contracts ranging from $1–$6.49M awarded to SBC Prime Contractors in the ADP 
market accounted for a significant number of the all the awards in this category, however 
the monetary award for the SBC is minimal.  After reviewing the data it is noted that 
SBC primes accounted for $55.7M of this award or fourteen percent of the total award.  
SBC Primes were awarded 1,063 contracts ranging from $1–$6.49M in the ADP market 
for FY12 (United States Government, 2013).  Of the 1,063 contracts awarded by the 
DON to SBC primes in this category 157 of the contracts were awarded to the top five 
SBC primes (United States Government, 2013).  The top five SBC prime contractors 





 SBC Prime Contracts $1–$6.49M vs. Total ADP Market Figure 22. 
The top five SBC primes account for $17.7M of the total SBC prime award for 
this category and this constitutes thirty-two percent of the eligible monetary award went 
to the top five companies.  The data collected in this section produce results that suggest 
that a significant portion of the ADP market is consistently awarded to a select few SBC 
primes.  Figure 23 represents the top five awardees as a percentage of the total DON 





FY 12 SBC Prime Contracts $1–$6.49M vs. 
Total ADP Market
Total Total SBC Prime Top 5 SBC Prime
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 Top 5 SBC Primes Awarded FY12 as a Percentage of Total Award Figure 23. 
$1–$6.49M ADP Market 
2. Profiles 
The top five companies in this category along with the total dollar amount 
awarded to each company for FY12 are provided in Table 13.  The following section is a 
brief profile of each company considered to be a top performer for this specific category.  
The purpose of this section is to highlight certain data in order to establish typical 
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Table 13.   Top 5 SBC Prime Awarded $1–$6.49M ADP Market Amount Awarded 
a. Immixgroup INC. 
Immixgroup INC. is classified as a provider of computers, peripherals and 
software (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The reported net sales 
of Immixgroup are $563.5M for FY12 and Immixgroup has 149 employees (Global Duns 
Market Identifiers, 2012).   
Immixgroup’s total FY 12 Contracts for the ADP Market $1–$6.49M was 
56 awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, 
independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Immixgroup was awarded 319 
contracts by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  Immixgroup’s history with the 
DoD/DON dates back to 2006 and the annual award total has ranged from $239.2K in 
2006 to $15.8M in 2012 (United States Government, 2013).     
Immixgroup is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that does not 
possess a great deal of intellectual property.  Immixgroup has not submitted any patents 
in the United States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  Immixgroup and has 
consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year 
from diversified and prolonged participation in ADP markets.    
b. World Wide Technology Holding CO. INC. 
World Wide Technology Holding CO. INC. is classified as a provider of 
computer peripherals, software and business consulting (Hoover's Company Records - In-
depth Records, 2013).  The reported net sales of World Wide Technology are $4B for 
Company Amount Awarded
Immixgroup INC. $4,899,272
World Wide Technology Holding CO. INC. $4,215,958
Four Points Technology LLC $3,521,080
Nana Regional Corporation INC. $2,764,528
Scalable Network Technologies INC. $2,345,066
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FY12 and World Wide Technology has 1,008 employees (Global Duns Market 
Identifiers, 2012).   
World Wide Technology’s total FY 12 Contracts for the ADP market $1–
$6.49M was 30 awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD 
agencies, independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, World Wide Technology was 
awarded 1,845 contracts by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  World Wide’s 
history with the DoD/DON dates back over a decade and the annual award total has 
ranged from $27.6M in 2000 to $239.6M in 2012 (United States Government, 2013).     
World Wide Technology is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that 
does not possess a great deal of intellectual property.  World Wide Technology has not 
submitted any patents in the United States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  
World Wide Technology and has consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing 
DoD/DON award totals each year from diversified and prolonged participation in ADP 
markets.    
c. Four Points Technology LLC 
Four Points Technology LLC is classified as a provider of computer 
peripherals and software (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The 
reported net sales of Four Points Technology are $64M for FY12 and Four Points 
Technology has 28 employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 2012).   
Four Points Technology’s total FY 12 Contracts for the ADP market $1–
$6.49M was 48 awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD 
agencies, independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Four Points Technology was 
awarded 450 contracts by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  Four Points’ 
history with the DoD/DON dates back to 2004 and the annual award total has ranged 
from $235.6K in 2004 to $23.9M in 2012 (United States Government, 2013).     
Four Points is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that does not 
possess a great deal of intellectual property.  Four Points has not submitted any patents in 
the United States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  Four Points and has 
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consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year 
from diversified and prolonged participation in ADP markets.    
d. Nana Regional Corporation INC. 
Nana Regional Corporation, INC. is classified as a provider of navigation, 
oil and gas field services, electrical services and combination utilities (Hoover's 
Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  The reported net sales of Nana Regional 
are $1.6B for FY12 and Nana Regional has 9,000 employees (Global Duns Market 
Identifiers, 2012).   
Nana Regional’s total FY 12 Contracts for the ADP market $1–$6.49M 
was 13 awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD agencies, 
independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Nana Regional was awarded 81 
contracts by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  Nana Regional’s history with 
the DoD/DON dates back over a decade and the annual award total has ranged from $1M 
in 2000 to $7.6M in 2012 (United States Government, 2013).     
Nana Regional is a recurring DoD/DON contracting partner that does not 
possess a great deal of intellectual property.  Nana Regional has not submitted any 
patents in the United States in the past 24 months (LexisNexis, 2013).  Nana Regional 
and has consistently benefitted as evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each 
year from diversified and prolonged participation in ADP markets.    
e. Scalable Network Technologies INC. 
Scalable Network Technologies, INC. is classified as a provider of 
computer programming services (Hoover's Company Records - In-depth Records, 2013).  
The reported net sales of Scalable Network Technologies are $4.4M for FY12 and 
Scalable Network Technologies has 43 employees (Global Duns Market Identifiers, 
2012).   
Scalable Networks’ total FY 12 Contracts for the ADP market $1–$6.49M 
was ten awards (United States Government, 2013).  Across all markets and DoD 
agencies, independent of a specific dollar amounts or PSCs, Scalable Network 
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Technologies was awarded 46 contracts by the DoD (United States Government, 2013).  
Scalable Network Technologies’ history with the DoD/DON dates back to 2008 and the 
annual award total has ranged from $550K in 2008 to $5.6M in 2012 (United States 
Government, 2013).     
Scalable Network Technologies is a recurring DoD/DON contracting 
partner that possesses minimal intellectual property.  Scalable Network Technologies has 
not submitted any patents in the United States in the past 24 months and one patent total 
(LexisNexis, 2013).  Scalable Network Technologies and has consistently benefitted as 
evidenced by increasing DoD/DON award totals each year from diversified and 
prolonged participation in ADP markets.    
3. Analysis  
a. Design Disclosure Barrier 
The SBC prime ADP market where each individual contract was for $1–
$6.49M suggests that there is a design disclosure barrier that prevents companies that 
possess intellectual property from participation in this category of the ADP market.  
Similar to the large primes in this category of the ADP market the SBCs that participate 
have no reliance on intellectual property.  The absence of patents submitted by the SBC 
in this category is evidence that design disclosure barriers exist and limit competition.     
b. Risk Mitigation Barrier 
Only two of the five large primes profiled in this category have established 
relationships with the DoD/DON that have been occurring for a decade and in some cases 
occurring for decades.  This forty percent suggests that there is little evidence of the DON 
being risk adverse when awarding contracts to SBCs in this category of the ADP market.  
The DON awarded fifteen percent of the total number of awards and thirty-two percent of 
the total dollar award to the top five SBC primes.  Conversely, all other SBC primes were 
awarded eighty-five percent of the total number of awards and sixty-eight percent of the 
total dollar award.      
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c. Prime Practices Barrier 
There is evidence in this category of prime practices that could limit 
competition.  The top five SBC primes in this category each experienced increasing 
award totals over the past decade.  This behavior indicates that there is a propensity for 
SBC primes to consistently seek more contract awards and to be awarded at an increasing 
rate as the familiarity to DoD/DON business practices increases.  However, as with the 
risk mitigation barrier the diversity in the total awards and amount limit the leverage 
created by the prime practice barrier in this category of the ADP market.  SBCs in this 
category of the ADP market have a far greater opportunity to displace top SBC primes 
that have benefited from an increasing annual award due to typical prime practices.     
N. SUMMARY 
The data presented in this chapter examines trends in DoD/DON contract award 
behavior to determine if NOA increases participation of the SBC.  Data was examined in 
twelve different combinations; size of the prime contractor, market PSC and price range 
of the award.  The size of the contractor considered in this research was large or SBC 
prime the size was determined by DoD/DON reporting criteria from 
www.defense.gov/contracts.  In order to compare data collected from two different 
sources the data collected from www.usaspending.gov was filtered and sorted to provide 
the researcher with both large and SBC prime data used to compare to the data found on 
www.defense.gov/contracts.  There were three categories of markets analyzed in this 
research, DON market (all PSCs), NOA market (PSCs 70 and D) and ADP market (PSC 
7030).  The categories selected provided the researcher with a normal baseline of SBC 
participation across the entire (all PSC) DON market.  This baseline was then compared 
to NOA (ADP and IT/Telecommunications) markets to establish how NOA policy 
increases competition through SBC participation.  The ADP (software) market was 
utilized by the researcher to determine if SBCs participated at higher rates than even the 
NOA market due to the innovative nature of software development and an increased 
reliance on intellectual property.  Small businesses have repeatedly demonstrated a 
contribution to leading the nation in innovation and driving the economy.  (USD [AT 
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&L], 2010, p. 10).  The price ranges of the awards analyzed were based on the DFARS 
public reporting requirements of contracts of $6.5M or greater.  Research focused on two 
price ranges, $6.5M or greater and $1-6.49M.  Analysis of the contract behavior in these 
ranges helped to determine the current role of the SBC independent of the market PSC, 
the size of the prime or the price range of the award. 
Collective analysis of the three categories revealed trends in contract award 
behavior as well as provided the researcher with information on the top companies in 
each category.  The information collected on the top companies, included how many 
patents (intellectual property) the company had claimed, the duration of the companies 
partnership with the DON as well as trends in annual monetary awards given to the top 
primes.  The summary information also included the size of the prime, the market PSC 
and the award price range; all of these characteristics were used by the researcher to 
establish common profiles among the top awardees.  These profiles were then used to 
establish how award behaviors are influenced by the size of the company and the product 
or service being provided upon award.  The profiles provided evidence used to 
substantiate or refute the entry barriers of design disclosure, risk mitigation and prime 
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IV. FINDINGS AND OPTIONS TO FACILITATE SBC 
PARTICIPATION 
A. FINDINGS  
In order to fully understand the impact of Naval Open Architecture (NOA) on the 
role of the small business concern (SBC) the following questions were considered in this 
research. 
 How does the SBC best fit in Department of the Navy (DON), NOA and 
Advanced Data Processing (ADP) Markets? 
 Does NOA encourage SBC participation? 
 Does the SBC experience barriers to entry? 
1. SBC Participation 
Large and SBC prime contractors were considered in this research in order to 
compare like markets where the only variable was the size of the prime contractor.  This 
strategy allowed the researcher to focus on how the DON award behavior was influenced 
by the size of the prime contractor.  Various markets (DON, NOA and ADP) were used 
to investigate how DON award behavior is influenced by the product or service being 
provided by the prime contractor. 
Research reveals that large primes were awarded eighty-three percent of all the 
total awards of the combined DON, NOA and ADP markets and eighty-seven percent of 
the total monetary award for Fiscal Year 2012 (FY12).  This equates to a total award 
share to the SBC of seventeen percent and a monetary award share of thirteen percent, 
well below the twenty-two and half percent mandate by the Office of Small Business 
Programs (OSBP) for 2012.  It is also noted that the SBC faces significant obstacles to 
obtaining contracts in the amount of $6.5M or greater, research indicates that for 
contracts of $6.5M or greater, eighty-eight percent of the DON market, ninety-seven 
percent of the NOA market and one hundred percent of the ADP market went to large 
primes.  It is clear that the best price range for the SBC to compete is for contracts less 
than $6.5M.  For contracts ranging from $1–$6.49M large primes experienced a decrease 
in award totals from thirteen to twenty-four percent.  The SBC prime experienced an 
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increase in participation across all three markets when the price range decreased from 
$6.5M to $1–6.49M.  The SBC participation increases were significant, in the DON 
market, SBC participation increased from three to twenty-five percent, the NOA market 
increased from three to twenty-six percent and the ADP market increased from zero to 
fourteen percent.  Of the twelve market combinations considered, the $1–6.49M NOA 
market is the most financially SBC participated market at twenty-six percent of total 
monetary award, three and a half percent over the OSBP mandate of twenty-two and a 
half percent.  The SBC in the $1–6.49M NOA market also ranks the highest among the 
twelve markets in total contracts awarded at thirty-two percent.  When compared to the 
DON and ADP markets this research indicates that NOA has successfully increased 
participation of the SBC in the NOA $1–$6.49M market.   
2. Barriers    
The use of intellectual property information collected on each company was used 
to explore the influence of design disclosure barriers and determine whether the design 
disclosure barrier was a real or perceived barrier to SBC entry to the DON, NOA and 
ADP markets.  This section of the research focused on how many patents each prime 
contractor had submitted in the past two years.  Evidence of patents indicated that the 
company under analysis possessed some intellectual property and due to becoming a 
prime contractor, was willing to risk some intellectual property because of design 
disclosure requirements in order to gain the contract award.  Research indicates that 
seventy-two percent of the large primes awarded a contract in these markets for FY12, 
regardless of product or service, possessed some intellectual data.  The seventy-two 
percent indicates that among large prime contractors design disclosure, the risk of 
releasing intellectual property to the DON was symptomatic of doing business with the 
DON and did not deter participation.  When compared to the design disclosure behavior 
of the large prime the SBC Prime possess a seemingly limited amount of intellectual 
property.  The SBC prime data revealed that only eight percent of the SBC primes 
awarded a contract in these three markets for FY12 had submitted patents in the past two 
years.  That is a sixty-four percent difference between large and SBC primes.  This sixty-
four percent suggests that the contracted SBC did not possess intellectual property or that 
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the SBC that possessed intellectual property was deterred by design disclosure 
requirements from participating in the DON, NOA and ADP markets.  When the same 
product service code (PSC) and price ranges are considered it was anticipated that the 
same intellectual property disclosure rate experienced by large primes would be observed 
when contracting SBC primes.  However, due to design disclosure barriers the top SBC 
primes that are consistently awarded contracts in these markets do not possess intellectual 
property.  In the absence of design disclosure barriers the SBC should produce 
intellectual property at a rate proportionate with the large prime in the same PSC and 
award price range.  The SBC design disclosure barrier is substantiated due to the very 
limited intellectual property that the SBC contributes to like markets and award price 
ranges as the large prime.    
The risk mitigation barrier is demonstrated by the DoD/DON through the 
recurring award behavior to top prime contractors regardless of prime size, market PSC 
or award price range.  Evidence in this research revealed that ninety-three percent of the 
top large primes awarded a contract FY12 by the DON in ADP, NOA and DON markets 
had established relationships with the DoD/DON that had existed for ten years or greater.  
This indicates that the risk mitigation barrier is employed by the DON for large primes; 
the DON is not encouraging competition in large prime markets due to risk aversion 
practices that propel the DON to employ the same familiar large primes time and time 
again.  The risk mitigation barrier is further maintained by pointing out that the share of 
the top large primes for these three markets is fifty-two percent of the monetary award 
and eighty-three percent of the total contracts awarded   
Conversely, when the same variable of risk through recurring relationship was 
considered, research indicated that top SBC primes experienced more competition in 
being awarded a prime contract and there was less evidence of a risk mitigation barrier.  
When compared to the top large primes the top SBC primes with a ten year or greater 
relationship with the DON is strikingly lower at fifty-seven percent.  The lack of a risk 
mitigation barrier is further supported when the share of the top SBC primes for these 
markets is twenty-eight percent of the total monetary award and only seventeen percent 
of the total contracts awarded.  The risk mitigation barrier does not apply to the SBC and 
 118
is found to be perceived.  It is worth mentioning that the risk mitigation barrier heavily 
applies to the large prime contractor. 
The prime practice barrier through evidence of increasing dollar values of 
previously reported recurring awards to top primes both large and SBC in these three 
markets was real and substantiated.  Ninety-seven percent of the top large primes and 
eighty-three percent of the top SBC primes considered in this research experienced an 
increasing financial total of award as successive years of doing business with the 
DoD/DON past.  This behavior can be attributed to the large prime gaining an 
understanding of DoD/DON contracting practices and subsequently gaining access to 
previously disclosed intellectual property.  Both risk mitigation barrier and design 
disclosure barrier are elements that contribute to the prime practice barrier.  The prime 
practice barrier is perpetrated by the top primes and perpetuated by the DoD/DON 
through typical prime practices.  This data analysis produced the following evidence of a 
prime practice barrier; entering FY13 a top FY12 company has a ninety percent chance 
independent of the size of the company, market PSC or price range of the award to 
experience an increase in revenue via DoD/DON contracting.  This prime practice barrier 
severely limits increasing competition because there is a finite amount of contracting 
money to go around.  The prime practice barrier is real for the SBC as well as the large 
prime.   
This analysis found that the current best role for the SBC in DON contracting, 
considering price range and market PSC is the $1–6.49M NOA market.  This research 
determined that NOA does increase competition in the NOA market $1-6.49 for the SBC.  
The study of the data presented in this chapter determined that with respect to the SBC, 
the design disclosure barrier is real, the SBC risk mitigation barrier is perceived and the 
SBC prime practice barrier is real.       
B. OPTIONS 
1. Policy Enforcement and Oversight Reform 
Options to facilitate increased SBC competition in DON contracting must start 
with changes in the organizational culture of the DoD.  There is a consistent 
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underutilization of the SBC across all markets due to a culture that permits SBC 
exclusion.  The 2012 House Committee on Armed Services Panel also found that DoD 
lacks a culture that fosters small business participation where appropriate (House 
Committee on Armed Services, 2012, p. 30).  The sentiment provided by the House 
Committee on Armed Services suggests that there is not only a culture that does not 
encourage SBC participation but there is also a suggestion of the appropriateness of the 
SBC participation.  Nearly $300 billion in prime contracts and more than $200 billion in 
subcontracting since fiscal year 2009 have been awarded to small bUSinesses by federal 
agencies (White House, 2012, p. 28).  The SBC is capable of an increased role in prime 
markets.  The DoD/DON must focus on providing the SBC with an increased opportunity 
to participate in all product PSCs of all markets.  The notion that there is appropriateness 
to the SBC participation encourages the exact culture the House Committee is trying to 
correct.  This research found that there is SBC participation in each of ADP, NOA and 
DON markets; all but the $6.5M or greater ADP prime market included the SBC as a 
prime contractor.  This research indicated that the SBC is a viable option in most prime 
markets, independent of the contract price range or the PSC of the selected market.   
The task of changing organizational culture is much easier to suggest than it is to 
accomplish, however, there are reported weaknesses in contracting behaviors, award 
monitoring and oversight of policy that the DoD/DON can initially place emphasis on 
correcting.  Concentrating on the oversight of policy enforcement standards that are 
designed to protect the SBC and diversify market participation should be the catalyst in 
changing organizational culture.  The acquisition process is often bureaucratic and rigid, 
with insufficient flexibility to allow appropriate application of management, oversight, 
and monitoring of small businesses (House Committee on Armed Services, 2012, pp. 73-
74).  There must be a concerted effort made by DON contracting officials to properly 
revise and enforce existing oversight policy designed to protect the interest of the SBC 
and hold officials accountable.  Congress should consider increasing the DoD’s small 
business prime contract and subcontract procurement goals, and increase accountability 
in the achievement of the procurement goals (House Committee on Armed Services, 
2012, p. 30).  Similar to the actions of the Small Business Administration (SBA), the 
 120
DoD/DON must develop new policy that strengthens officials’ authority necessary to 
properly manage SBC participation in various markets.  Working with its federal 
partners, the SBA has taken multiple steps to strengthen oversight and enforcement to 
better ensure the benefits of federal small business contracting programs are going only 
to eligible firms (White House, 2012, p. 32).  Many of the panel participants felt that DoD 
needs to improve on the monitoring processes of SBC participation (House Committee on 
Armed Services, 2012, p. 86).  The DoD/DON must place emphasis on ensuring the 
compliance of SBC award monitoring procedures in the FAR and DFARS to confirm that 
SBCs are being afforded competitive opportunities to perform work.  Therefore, the FAR 
and DFARS should be reviewed, and clarified if required, to eliminate ambiguity 
regarding responsibility for ensuring compliance (House Committee on Armed Services, 
2012, p. 31). 
It is critical that the DON address the gaps in contracting behaviors, award 
monitoring and oversight of policy that influences SBC participation prior to attempting 
to eliminate SBC barriers to entry.  Without a cultural reform that fosters an environment 
that is conducive to protecting the SBC, options to eliminate or alleviate SBC 
participation barriers are unlikely to make an impact.            
2.   New SBC Competition Measures 
SBC goals are negotiated with the SBA every two years with each federal agency, 
the SBC prime contracting goal is currently twenty-three percent of all prime contract 
dollars (House Committee on Armed Services, 2012, p. 13).  The current process of a 
negotiated SBC prime contract as a percentage of dollars does little to ensure that there is 
SBC competition for any DON contract.  The process of determining that twenty-three 
percent of the prime award dollars will go to an SBC does not deter prime practice 
barriers that consistently increase dollar awards to recurring top SBC prime providers.  
The DON must create new competition goals that are focused on encouraging an increase 
in SBC participation in all prime markets.  Prime practice barriers (the propensity for 
recurring primes to be contracted increasing awards) would be diminished through a 
spending limit placed on recurring top primes.   
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A spending cap would prevent the DON from awarding significant increases in 
the percentage of dollar awards to top recurring primes.  Capping the percentage of the 
increase in the dollar award that a recurring prime can experience would allow more 
contracting dollars to be distributed to other SBCs in similar markets.  The distribution of 
contracting dollars would cause an increase in SBC competition.  This increase in 
competition would drive down costs through the creation of DON cost leverage and 
would encourage more innovative SBCs to attempt to win awards.   
In addition to a top prime award cap, the DON should explore a diversity quota.  
This quota would be designed to require contracting officials to spread the total number 
of the awards as well as the contracting dollars to other eligible SBCs in similar markets.  
Diversity quotas would ensure that there is fair and balanced spread of opportunity to all 
eligible participants.  The application of a diversity quota would prevent a limited number 
of top primes from absorbing a majority of the opportunity (total awards and monetary 
award).  An example of this behavior is depicted in this research is the SBC ADP $1–
$6.49M market that saw thirty-two percent of the monetary award go to the top five SBC 
primes.  When faced with a decision to employ a top prime or miss a diversity quota a 
contracting official would be implored to contract the SBC that helps attain the diversity 
quota rather than succumbing to prime practice barriers and choosing the recurring top 
prime provider.   
Additional quota measures to ensure an increase in SBC competition should 
include a provision in the negotiated goal that sets aside a mandatory percentage of SBC 
prime awards to new competitors.  This quota could be adjusted each year based on the 
previous year’s number of new competitor bids received by the DON from SBCs in 
specific markets.  The new competitor goal should not be static or the same goal across 
all SBC prime markets, it should vary annually and across all PSCs.   
In the event introducing new competition quotas proves too difficult to execute 
the DoD/DON should at a minimum raise existing competition quotas to reflect the 
decrease in federal spending that is surely to cut into SBC awards.   
Given that federal spending through contracts is expected to decrease, 
there is a fear that the decrease will be disproportionately borne by small 
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businesses.  To offset the effect of the decline in spending, the small 
business prime contracting goal should be raised.  (House Committee on 
Armed Services, 2012, p. 13)  
An increase in the current SBC prime competition goal would introduce more 
award dollars to the SBC market.  Raising the current SBC prime competition quota 
could be instituted as early as FY14.  A 2012 panel led by the National Economic 
Council, believes that there recommendations aimed at improving DoD’s SBC 
contracting performance that, if implemented properly, could enable DoD to successfully 
achieve a goal of greater than twenty-three percent small business participation on all 
prime contract dollars (White House, 2012, p. 14).    
The existing measures of SBC competition are not catalysts to increase SBC 
competition, although goals are controlled and managed by the DoD/DON and should be 
used to force an increase in SBC competition.  The DON is missing an opportunity to 
shape the competitive balance of SBC prime markets because of limited existing 
competition measures that fail to capture relevant data used to indicate an increase of 
SBC competition.  The current system simply measures what percentage of the dollar 
award went to a SBC.  Theoretically one SBC could account for the mandated twenty-
three percent of monetary award and SBC competition would be considered adequate.  
The DoD/DON must introduce new SBC prime competition measures of success in order 
to increase SBC competition.   
3. Strength in Numbers 
The DON should investigate possibilities to stimulate growth of collaborative 
SBC prime contracting groups in an effort to encourage cooperative SBC groups to 
compete vs. large prime contractors.  In addition to increasing competition and expanding 
opportunities for SBCs, encouraging groups provides for an environment that will 
accelerate innovation and new solutions and approaches to DoD/DON requirements 
(Office of Small Business Programs, 2007, p. 9).  There is evidence in this research that 
suggests as SBCs collaborate the award tendency is an increase in both monetary award 
and the total awards contracted to SBCs.  The DON prime market, where contracts 
awarded for $6.5M or greater, reflects this award behavior in SBC collaborative groups 
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increasing an opportunity for an award.  Participation for the single source SBC was 
approximately three percent of the monetary award and eleven percent of the total 
awarded number, this increased by nine percent of the monetary award and four percent 
of the total awarded when SBCs collaborated on joint awards (U.S. Department of 
Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Public Affairs], 2013).   
The benefits of SBC collaborative groups could also simulate innovative ideas 
and solutions.  Panel participants noted that most SBCs do not have all the answers, yet 
they could be successful if they were encouraged to collaborate with other SBCs (House 
Committee on Armed Services, 2012, p. 86).  Increasing collaborative SBC groups would 
increase SBC competition and permit the DON to maximize on the benefits of decreased 
cost through cost leverage opportunities as well as capitalize on the innovative nature of 
the SBC.  Encouraging small business teams is one way to increase both competition and 
SBC participation (Office of Small Business Programs, 2007, p. 7).  The SBC greatly 
increases opportunities for financial growth and becomes much more likely to win prime 
awards that it would not otherwise have an opportunity to compete for, if the SBC was 
not in a collaborative environment with other SBCs.  Just as large businesses regularly 
team in the federal marketplace to achieve certain benefits, small businesses can achieve 
the same benefits and expand their prime contract (and subcontract) procurement 
opportunities (Office of Small Business Programs, 2007, p. 10).   
The anticipated result of encouraging SBC collaboration groups ultimately is that 
DON experiences decreased costs and increases the opportunity to benefit from SBC 
innovation.  The SBC through collaborative groups becomes an increasing threat to 
compete with large primes for significant contracts.    
4. Know the Market 
This research indicates that the SBC best participates in the $1–$6.49M award 
price range when compared to the $6.5M or greater award price range.  Independent of 
the PSC of a market the SBC experienced a twenty percent increase in monetary awards 
and a twenty-three percent increase in the award total as the amount of the award 
decreased to 6.49M or less.   
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The DON must focus efforts on creating more competition for the $6.5M or 
greater contract market and maximizing participation in the 6.49M or less award price 
ranges.  This could include SBC collaborative groups as suggested in this research or 
requiring contract officials to award a fixed percentage of the monetary award as well as 
the total of the award.  The DON could also examine the awards of $1–$6.49M to 
determine what large primes could be eliminated from participation in this price range.  
According to this research and the markets analyzed, large primes account for ninety-five 
percent of the monetary award and ninety-four percent of the total number of awards for 
the $6.5M or greater markets and seventy-eight percent of the monetary award and 
seventy-one percent of the total award for the 6.49M or less markets.  Eliminating these 
companies from participating in the 6.49M or less award price ranges would increase 
competition and opportunities for the SBC prime substantially. 
Based on this research for the ADP, NOA and DON markets the best strategy for 
the SBC prime is to focus on sole source awards that are less than 6.49M and to use 
collaborative groups to bid on contracts in excess of $6.5M.         
5. Commitment to the Military 
It is not until the current culture, polices and typical contracting behavior of the 
DON is reformed that the SBC will realize substantial increases in the monetary and total 
prime awards.  Therefore it is extremely important for the SBC to attempt to capitalize on 
and exploit the limited risk mitigation barrier and prime practice barrier that are typically 
perpetrated by the DON.  Contracting officials view SBCs as risky and rather than risk 
being responsible for a SBC set-aside that might go sour, it is more than attractive to 
offload that risk to a large prime (Garrett, 2007, p. 12).  This research provides 
amplification on this sentiment and recognizes that the DoD/DON’s typical behavior is to 
employ the large prime; however, this research goes on to suggest that this behavior also 
applies to top SBC primes.  Top SBC primes are deemed by the DoD/DON through a 
limited risk mitigation barrier to be less risky than a SBC that is not a top prime provider.    
To exploit what is described as a limited risk mitigation barrier the SBC should 
consider a practice of limiting initial award total and dollar expectations and simply bid 
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to win any award and initiate a relationship with the DoD/DON.  A participant in a 2012 
House Committee on Armed Service panel stated that it is hard for the SBC to get in the 
door (House Committee on Armed Services, 2012, p. 89).  This research indicates that 
fifty-six percent of the SBCs awarded contracts in the ADP, NOA and DON markets for 
Fiscal Year 2012 (FY12) had been awarded a contract for a minimum of ten consecutive 
years by the DoD/DON.  This behavior suggests that the SBC need only get a single 
contract and there is a better than fifty percent chance that in ten years the contracted 
SBC would still be in business with the DoD/DON. 
The SBC should also attempt to capitalize on the prime practice barrier that is 
overwhelmingly made obvious in this research.  The prime practice barrier indicates that 
the DoD/DON has increased or maintained the monetary award of eighty-three percent of 
the top SBC prime contractors over the course of the SBC’s relationship with the 
DoD/DON.  From the same 2012 House Committee on Armed Services panel that 
suggested it was difficult for the SBC to get an opportunity to participate in federal 
contracting; another panel member said contracting officials tended toward “sole-source 
for life” approaches to procurement (House Committee on Armed Services, 2012, p. 
103).  SBCs would be wise to simply get its foot in the door and wait its turn in order to 
experience increased award total and revenue.   
6. Reporting Regulations  
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) subpart 205.303, 
Announcement of Awards, paragraph a, section 1, revised 2010, requires that the DoD 
report all contractual actions, including modifications, which have a face value, excluding 
unexercised options, of more than $6.5M are reported daily via a public announcement 
(Department of Defense, 1998, pp. 205.3-1).  This regulation should be reformed to 
include all contractual actions of any face value.  Removing all public reporting barriers, 
specifically for contracts from $1–$6.49M and requiring public disclosure (as is currently 
the practice with contracts of $6.5M or greater) would place contracting officials and 
agencies under increased scrutiny.  This type of open disclosure would encourage 
independent research by small business experts and advocates who reside outside the 
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influence of the federal government to determine the current and potential utilization of 
the SBC in DON contracting activities.  Autonomous research should be used to establish 
reasonable expectations in SBC participation and in shaping policy that directs 
DoD/DON contracting behaviors.  A one hundred percent reporting policy on all 
transactions builds an accurate database for the DON to display the real opportunity for 
SBC, creating the ability to refute claims of barriers to enter federal markets that limit 
SBC participation using quantifiable data.   
7. Intellectual Property Protection 
There is continuing discussion on intellectual property rights and DoD policy 
from within the Federal Government that suggests problematic practices on the DoD’s 
use of intellectual property.  The DoD IG should assess the degree to which DoD 
observes the restrictions in existing law and policy related to use, disclosure, or release of 
intellectual property (House Committee on Armed Services, 2012, p. 74).  This data 
collected in this research along with panel testimony substantiates the claim that the SBC 
is deterred by design disclosure barriers.   
A member of a 2012 House Committee on Armed Services Panel stated that large 
primes do not want SBCs to innovate and another panel member stated that 
anyone that wants to do business with you wants your technology.  Both agreed 
that more needs to be done to protect the intellectual property of small businesses.  
(House Committee on Armed Services, 2012, p. 100)  
The analysis conducted in this research specifies that there is a sixty-four percent 
difference between large and SBC primes participating in the same markets, for similar 
contracts, in the submission of patents to protect intellectual property.  The DoD/DON 
must take action to breakdown the design disclosure barrier that limits SBC participation 
in contracting opportunities in order to maximize the impact of the innovative nature of 
the SBC.  The SBC is presently providing the products and solutions needed to support 
Sailors and Marines, and can provide the innovations necessary to help solve life cycle 
sustainment problems (Dussault, 2012, p. 13).   
A potential option to facilitate SBC participation in NOA and DON markets is to 
permit SBCs to retain intellectual property indefinitely so long as the SBC is considered a 
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viable provider of a service or product.  Allowing the SBC to retain its intellectual capital 
throughout the course of what this research suggests is typically a recurring and lengthy 
association with the DON (once an initial contract is awarded) would increase 
competition via increased SBC participation due to increased protection of SBC 
intellectual property.  Smaller businesses can experience particular difficulties in 
protecting their rights because of their size and the comparatively limited resources 
available to them (House Committee on Armed Services, 2012, p. 63).   
Permitting indefinite SBC ownership of intellectual property should exist as long 
as the SBC is considered viable by an independent panel.  In the event the independent 
panel determines that the SBC is no longer a viable provider, a provision in the contract 
would allow the failed SBC (that can no longer provide the original product or service 
requiring the use of its intellectual property) to select a replacement.  This replacement 
could be an offshoot of an existing company, partnership or collaborative team member 
in an effort to allow the original SBC to retain some control over the resting place of its 
intellectual property.  This provision would be used to encourage an increase in the initial 
SBC competitive bidding process aimed at maximizing the innovative contribution of the 
SBC and to maximize the obvious benefits to the DON through increased SBC 
participation.   
C. SUMMARY 
Of the twelve distinct markets reviewed in this research it is found that the SBC 
best performs in the NOA $1–$6.49M market.  This market includes all information the 
information technology (IT) and telecommunications (TELECOM) contracts for FY12.  
Based on the analysis and data collected in this research it is the recommendation that 
NOA does increase competition via the SBC for IT and TELECOM markets.  Despite 
findings that suggest NOA policy is delivering on its principle to increase SBC 
competition there is room for improvement.   
Analysis of existing literature and collected data in this research substantiate that 
some barriers of SBC participation in DON contracting opportunities exist.  Research 
suggests that the barriers created by typical prime practices and design disclosure 
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requirements impact the SBC’s ability to maximize competitive participation for DON, 
NOA and ADP contracts.  These barriers are present in both award price ranges ($1–
$6.49M and $6.5M or greater) examined by this research.  The risk mitigation barrier is 
refuted as this research indicates that the risk mitigation is most prominently practiced in 
the large prime sector of the market.  There was little evidence found in this research to 
suggest that the SBC has to endure risk mitigation barriers to entry.   
Based on existing literature and the analysis of the data collected in this research, 
seven options to facilitate SBC participation in DON contracting were presented.  The 
options were derived from and focused on the most reported on (from existing literature) 
and data determined barriers (from analysis) that exist for the SBC.  Options ranged from 
general policy and oversight reform to the specific intellectual property options designed 
to increase the opportunity for the SBC.  The options provided to facilitate SBC 
participation were designed to force DON policy and quotas to encourage participation 
and to inspire the SBC to want to increase participation through more SBC friendly 
practices and policy changes.    
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH  
A. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this research was to better to understand the relationship between 
Department of the Navy (DON) contracting behavior, Naval Open Architecture (NOA) 
policy and the role that the small business concern (SBC) in various product service 
codes (PSC), specifically to find out if NOA does increase competition via the SBC.  The 
objective of this research was to understand if the SBC barriers to entry reported in 
existing literature were real (instituted by the DON) or perceived (by the SBC).  Through 
data analysis pertinent options to overcome reported obstacles that the SBC encounters in 
the DON market place were derived.  These options were generated in an attempt to 
maximize DON benefits that have been articulated through existing NOA literature.  The 
DON benefits that are consistently attributed to increased SBC participation are 
decreased cost and growth in innovation.  
Fiscal Year 2012 (FY12) DON spending data was used to construct DON 
contracting trends that led to options to facilitate an increase in SBC participation in 
variety of markets.  In an effort to understand typical DON contracting behaviors across 
all products or services, awarded by the DON, this research focused on multiple PSCs 
and award price ranges.  The variation in size of the prime contractor, prime 
characteristics, the PSC and the award price range were critical in establishing typical 
DON contracting behaviors.  These behaviors were then used to compare and contrast 
how NOA policy impacted SBC participation in information technology (IT) and 
telecommunications (TELECOM) markets, categorized in this research as the NOA 
market.   
Through analysis of DON spending data, recurring prime awardee profiles, 
various PSCs and award price ranges; SBCs along with the DON will be better equipped 
to utilize and understand the reasoning for the options presented in this research.  The 
options presented in this research are designed to facilitate SBC participation and to 
encourage the DON to capitalize on benefits that are offered by the SBC.  This research 
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contained a review of existing literature and analysis of collected data used to derive 
options to facilitate SBC participation and in order to answer the research questions 
presented in the introduction.   
1. Does NOA increase SBC participation? 
Analysis of the ADP, NOA and DON markets indicates that of the various 
combinations of PSCs, award price ranges and size of the prime contractor examined the 
best performance of the SBC prime was in the $1–$6.49M NOA market.  The NOA 
market for this research was considered to include PSCs 70 and D.  PSC 70 is assigned to 
advanced data processing (ADP) and D is assigned to information technology (IT) / 
telecommunications (TELECOM).  The SBC in the $1–$6.49M NOA market realized 
twenty-six percent of the total monetary award and thirty-two percent of the total number 
of awards given out by the DON, the highest percentage of any studied category.  SBC 
participation at the twenty-six percent rate of the monetary award was not only the 
highest percentage of the award of the various PSCs and award price ranges analyzed; but 
the twenty-six percent surpasses the FY12 mandated twenty-two and a half percent of 
total prime monetary award to the SBC.  This research finds that NOA policy does 
increase SBC participation and that the propensity of SBC participation in $1–$6.49M 
NOA markets is greater than the propensity of the SBC participation in all other 
considered markets.          
2. Where does the SBC best participate in DON contracting? 
Research indicates that the SBC faces significant obstacles to obtaining contracts 
in the amount of $6.5M or greater.  Found in this research, contracts of $6.5M or greater 
eighty-eight percent of the DON market, ninety-seven percent of the NOA market and 
one hundred percent of the ADP market went to large primes.  Under the current policy 
and DON contracting behaviors it is resoundingly clear that the SBC best competes in the 
$1–$6.49M award price range.  Analysis reveals that for contracts ranging from $1–
$6.49M large primes experienced a decrease in award totals from thirteen percent in 
DON markets, twenty-four percent in NOA markets and fourteen percent in ADP 
markets.  The SBC prime experienced an increase in participation across all three markets 
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when the price range decreased from $6.5M to $1-6.49M.  The SBC participation 
increases were significant, in the DON market, SBC participation increased from three to 
twenty-five percent, the NOA market increased from three to twenty-six percent and the 
ADP market increased from zero to fourteen percent.  The NOA market independent of 
the award price range yields the highest percentage of monetary award to the SBC at 
combined twenty-nine percent.  This indicates to SBCs that the most money, hence the 
best opportunity available to the SBC is in ADP, IT and TELECOM (NOA market).    
3. Are the barriers to SBC participation real or perceived? 
Three barriers to SBC participation were developed and examined in this 
research.  From existing literature there were a number of barriers discussed, however, 
there were recurring practices and examples that led to this research to develop the 
barriers of design disclosure, risk mitigation and prime practices.   
The design disclosure barrier is described as a barrier due to DON design 
disclosure policy that limits SBC participation.  The limited SBC participation attributed 
to the design disclosure barrier is realized through a process of self-elimination that the 
SBC participates in to protect disclosure of its intellectual property.   
This research focused on the use of intellectual property in the form of patents.  
Information collected on each prime contractor was used to explore the effect of design 
disclosure barriers on the SBC and to determine if the design disclosure barrier was a real 
or perceived barrier to SBC participation.  Research considered how many patents each 
prime contractor had submitted in the past two years.  The research used evidence of 
patents as an indication that the company under analysis possessed some intellectual 
property, and due to becoming a prime contractor, was willing to risk some intellectual 
property due to design disclosure requirements.   
Seventy-two percent of the large primes awarded a contract in the ADP, NOA and 
DON markets regardless of product or service, possessed some intellectual data via a 
patent.  The seventy-two percent indicates that among large prime contractors design 
disclosure was merely a typical and anticipated cost of doing business with the DON.   
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SBC prime data discloses that eight percent of the SBC primes awarded a contract 
in these three markets for FY12 had submitted patents in the past two years, a sixty-four 
percent difference between large and SBC primes.  This sixty-four percent suggests one 
of two justifications for the lack of SBC intellectual property, the SBC prime does not 
possess intellectual property or that the SBC that possesses intellectual property is 
deterred by design disclosure requirements from participating in DON contracting.   
Considering the same PSC and award price ranges it is anticipated by logical 
observation that the same intellectual property disclosure rate experienced by large 
primes would be observed when contracting SBC primes.  However it is determined by 
this research that due to design disclosure barriers the top SBC primes in these markets 
do not possess intellectual property and those companies that do possess intellectual 
property choose not to participate in DON contracting.      
The risk mitigation barrier is demonstrated in this research through the recurring 
award behavior of top prime contractors regardless of prime size, market PSC or award 
price range.  When practiced, risk mitigation barriers diminish competition opportunities 
for both large and SBC primes, independent of the PSC or price range of the award.  Data 
collected on each of the large prime companies examined in this research revealed that 
ninety-three percent of the top large primes awarded in FY12 through DON contracting 
had persistent dealings with the DoD/DON that have endured for over a decade.  The 
propensity for the DoD/DON to contract for prolonged periods indicates that there is risk 
mitigation barrier employed by the DON for large primes.  This research indicates that 
the DON is not encouraging competition in large prime markets due to risk aversion 
practices.   
On the other hand when the same element of risk mitigation through recurring 
relationships is measured for top SBC primes research indicates that SBC primes 
experience more competition and there is less evidence of a risk mitigation barrier.  
Compared to the top large primes the top SBC primes with a decade or greater recurring 
relationship with the DON is lower at fifty-seven percent.  The absence of a risk 
mitigation barrier is further supported when the portion of the top SBC primes award for 
FY12 is considered.  The SBC portion of the monetary award in FY12 was twenty-eight 
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percent of the total monetary award and only seventeen percent of the total contracts as 
compared to eighty-three percent and fifty-two percent for the large prime.  This research 
indicates the risk mitigation barrier does not apply to the SBC and is found to be 
perceived.   
The prime practice barrier was derived by this research through evidence of the 
increasing dollar amount of awards that are consistently given to top recurring large and 
SBC primes.  This research found that ninety-seven percent of the top large primes and 
eighty-three percent of the top SBC primes experienced an increasing financial total of 
award as each consecutive year of doing business with the DON past.  This conduct is 
accredited to the top primes gaining familiarity of contracting practices and consequently 
gaining access to previously disclosed intellectual property.  Both risk mitigation barrier 
and design disclosure barrier are elements that contribute to the prime practice barrier.  
The prime practice barrier is executed by the top primes and maintained by the DON 
through typical prime practices.  Data from this research produces the following evidence 
of a prime practice barrier; entering FY13 a top FY12 company had a ninety percent 
chance independent of the size of the company, market PSC or price range of the award 
to experience an increase in revenue via DoD/DON contracting.  This prime practice 
barrier severely limits increasing competition because there is a finite amount of 
contracting money to be dispensed.  The prime practice barrier was found real and 
substantiated by this research. 
4. What options are needed to facilitate SBC participation? 
Founded on prevailing literature and the examination of the statistics composed in 
this research seven options to facilitate SBC participation in DON contracting were 
offered.  The options were the result of a focus placed on the most reported on 
description of barriers and this data used to substantiate or refute entry barriers believed 
to occur most frequently for the SBC.  Options ranged from overall strategy and 
enforcement reform to the precise intellectual property options calculated to increase the 
prospects of participation for the SBC.  The options provided to facilitate SBC 
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participation were designed to force DON policy and quotas to encourage participation 
and to motivate the SBC to increase participation through more SBC friendly practices 
and strategy modifications. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH   
This research focused on large and SBC prime contractors in an effort to 
investigate typical DON contracting behaviors and determine how NOA policy 
influenced these behaviors.  The data collected on the prime contracts and prime 
contractors in this research was used to establish baselines of SBC participation in 
various markets as a prime provider vs. large prime provider participation in the same 
markets.  The data collected on the SBC and large prime contractors was then compared 
and used to refute or substantiate barriers reported in existing literature.  This research 
was limited in this study to prime contractors in an attempt to consider the SBC free from 
large prime influence.  This research attempted to eliminate as much extraneous influence 
experienced by the SBC in DON contracting as possible in an effort to capture data that 
would suggest real SBC barriers to entry.  The most efficient way to accomplish an 
autonomous view of the SBC in DON contracting was to focus on prime contracts.   
Future research should consider large and SBC sub-contractor data collected from 
the same ADP/NOA/DON markets and the same award price ranges.  Collecting the 
same data from the same sources and only changing the variable of prime contracts vs. 
sub-contracts will either provide further support of the barriers reported in this research 
or prove that the trends and obstacles found in this research do not apply to sub-contract 
markets.  In the event the sub-contract data refutes the findings in this research new sub-
contractor barriers to entry of the DON contracting market will surface as a result.  Using 
new found sub-contractor barriers, options to facilitate SBC sub-contractor participation 
could be generated.  Just as in this research, any sub-contractor options should aim to 
maximize the mutual benefit of association between the DON and increasing SBC 
participation as sub-contractors. 
Studying the prime or sub-contract behavior in the Department of the Army 
(DOA) and Department of the Air Force (DOAF) will reveal trends in contracting 
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behavior in other branches that could be used to improve DON contracting behaviors 
focused on maximizing the innovative capacity of the SBC.  Future research could also 
consider how other federal agencies compare to the entire DoD.  A study that compares 
SBC contracting data from disparate federal agencies may possibly encourage the 
distribution of successful lessons learned among agencies as it pertains to SBC 
utilization.  Examining other federal departments might prove to be a catalyst to SBC 
quota reform throughout the government.  Quota reform could be based on certain 
agencies or departments’ propensity to employ the SBC; these findings could also be 
used to answer the question of whether or not the DoD/DON is doing enough to employ 
the SBC in contracting opportunities.   
Selecting a single PSC and studying every company awarded a contract for in a 
given FY would provide further granularity on how SBCs contribute intellectual property 
to the DON.  This data could be used to clarify and establish expectations of the SBCs 
role in providing innovation through intellectual property to the DON.  An additional 
benefit of studying all awardees vs. just the top awardees would determine if intellectual 
property is being contributed by the SBC as a whole at a rate more substantial than that of 
the large corporation population. 
This research was limited to the study of a single FY.  Collecting data for multiple 
FYs would provide an increased understanding of DON contracting behaviors, SBC 
participation in various markets, award price ranges, possible SBC barriers to entry and 
the historical influence of NOA and the role of the SBC in DON contracting.    
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